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ABSTRACT 
What explains collaboration and conflict between Kurdish and Armenian societies 
during the Late Ottoman period? In order to answer this question this thesis focuses on 
the relationship between structures in Kurdish and Armenian societies and political 
behavior. The significance of this study lies in that it provides a new angle from which to 
look at the Armenian question, in relation to the Kurds as opposed to only in relation to 
the Ottoman state and Great Power, and also in that it analyzes the impact of political, 
ethnic, and national consciousness on groups' interactive behavior. In order to explain 
conflict and collaboration, this study compares and contrasts the socioeconomic and 
political experiences that the Kurds and Armenians had with Ottoman state, examines the 
affect of the Ottoman policy on the local dynamics of power, and analyzes the role 
internal and external political factors on interactive behavior. It is argued that 
adjustments in the traditional power relationship, resultant from the implementation of 
various policy changes, gave rise to new political spaces through which new social 
structures were formed. The competition between new and old structures for power led 
some groups to radicalize their policies in order to secure their continued existence. The 
factors that determined a group's decision to ally with or fight against other groups was 
influenced by influential individuals' interpretations of the political situation and their 
internal and external structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The mid-1890s was the scene of massive violence and social strife among and 
between the Kurdish and Armenian populations of eastern Anatolia. Throughout this 
period Kurdish tribal chiefs contended among each other and also with Ottoman 
administrators for control of political offices; Kurdish and Armenian peasants suffered 
under the heavy hands of tribal and Ottoman administrative authority; and Kurdish and 
Armenian political groups clashed with one another (particularly during the 1890s) 
resulting in soaring death tolls. How does one account for the increased conflict between 
the Armenians and Kurds in the 1890s? Was it a result of an insidious government 
agenda to divide and conquer the Armenians and Kurds in order to thwart Armenian 
nationalist or separatist aims in eastern Anatolia and dissolve the control of the Kurdish 
tribes, or was it the result of an Armenian nationalist-induced rebellion which spurred 
already festering social tensions between Armenians and Kurds to culminate in 
bloodshed? To answer these questions this study examines various interactions among 
the Kurds, the Armenians, and the Ottoman government; looks at the effect of 
government policy on power structures within Armenian and Kurdish society, and 
explores the reasons for the ultimate inability of Armenians and Kurds to collaborate 
against the Ottoman government. Ultimately it seeks to offer a new understanding of the 
Kurdish-Armenian relationship as socially interstructural and interelite rather than 
interethnic, interreligious, intercultural, or international (in the sense of it being between 
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two people nations rather than two nation states). 
Methodology 
Although many studies of eastern Anatolia during the later Abdiilhamid II period 
discuss Kurdish-Armenian relations, only a few articles have given a detailed analysis of 
this issue. The discourse on Kurdish-Armenian relations has largely been subsumed 
within the general narrative of the Armenian genocide debate, which itself is primarily 
concerned with the issue of culpability for the Armenian massacres, rather than the 
broader topic of the interactions between and among the groups. The general dearth of 
scholarship on Kurdish-Armenian relations can be attributed to a number of factors, and 
perhaps have to do with the fact that Armenian studies and Kurdish studies are not placed 
within the same area studies group within the area studies divisions: the former being 
placed in Central Eurasian Studies and the latter placed in Near Eastern studies. With 
few exceptions, studies have looked at the Kurdish-Armenian relationship as part of the 
Armenian question rather than the Kurdish question. Furthermore, the daunting task of 
gathering sources which are scattered throughout numerous archives in Russia, Istanbul, 
and Europe in a number of different languages has probably kept scholars from delving 
very far into this topic. Lastly much of the research on eastern Anatolia has been guided 
to fit questions particular to the Armenian Genocide debate, which continues to be highly 
controversial and a source of severe social tensions in some regions. As a result scholars 
have been drawn to study eastern Anatolia primarily in the context of the question of the 
Armenian genocide. One could speculate that were it not for the ongoing controversy 
surrounding this region during this period, the body of scholarship regarding Eastern 
Anatolia might not have been so large. Libaridian states that the dearth of scholarship 
 
 
     
i    
   i   
    lf 
     
     
      
 
  
     
i   
    
  c   
   t    
       
    
   
         
nn     
     
     
3 
that focuses on Armenian-Kurdish relations can be attributed to the following: 
Historians and scientists are not abstract entities who develop interests and 
conclusions in a vacuum. They usually begin with perspectives that predetermine 
the subjects to study as well as the questions to be raised with regard to that 
subject.1 
There are a few noteworthy studies of Kurdish-Armenian relations. The most 
comprehensive account was written by Garo Sasuni, whose book entitled Kurt Ulusal 
Hareketleri ve Ermeni-Kurt lliskileri (15.yy 'dan Giinumuze) [The Kurdish National 
Movements and Armenian-Kurdish Relations (From the fifteenth Century to Our Day)] 
was originally published in Armenian as an eighteen-part series in the Boston-based 
Armenian journal Hairenik Amsagir between 1929 and 1931, and subsequently translated 
into Turkish and published as a book in Beirut in 1969. The book provides a detailed 
and intricate analysis of the Kurdish-Armenian relationship throughout numerous periods 
of time in the Ottoman Empire based on numerous archival sources, Armenian 
publications, and European reports. While Sasuni is undoubtedly intent on lending 
credence to the notion that the Ottoman Empire was only entity directly responsible for 
the massacres of Armenians, the concern to prove culpability actually appears subsidiary 
to his main argument: that a Kurdish-Armenian union was possible and necessary in 
order to put pressure on Turkey to create independent Kurdish and Armenian states. 
Throughout his book he cites instances of collaboration between Kurds and Armenians 
1
 Gerard J. Libaridian, Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 170. This quote is taken from a chapter 9, 
"Ideology and History: Problems in the Study of Armeno-Kurdish Relations," which was 
first published in 1988 under the title "Studies of Armeno-Kurdish Relations and Its 
Problems" in Studia Kurdica, nos. 1-5 (1988), 63-76. 
For more background information on Sasuni see Tessa Hofmann and Gerayer 
Koutcharian, "The History of Armenian-Kurdish Relations in the Ottoman Empire," 
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against the Ottoman Empire and attributes hostility between Kurds and Armenians to the 
Ottoman Empire's divide-and-conquer tactics. 
A propaganda slant is evident in Sasuni's writings: "What is the goal of the 
Armenian and Kurdish friendship and union? The deliverance of Armenia and Kurdistan 
from the Turkish yoke." However his book represents a much more sophisticated 
approach to understanding Kurdish-Armenian relations than most of the Dashnak 
propaganda circulating during the 1920s. He presents a complex series of events between 
Kurds and Armenians in a cohesive and fluid manner, explaining reasons for both 
collaboration and conflict. Conflict, he asserts, was generally a result of the nefarious 
designs of Turkish divide-and-conquer policy and not part of any primordial cultural 
tension between the Kurds and the Armenians: 
The fundamental reasons for enmity in past periods are no longer, and we must 
accept that the enmity is no longer for the [following] reasons: The Armenian was 
the servant and the Kurd was the master. In our day such a class relationship is no 
longer present. The Kurd was armed and the Armenian was unarmed and the 
Kurds' livelihood was dependent upon exploitation and robbery. Today this is no 
longer... if yesterday we were enemies today we are friends... we are not praising 
the Armenian-Kurdish friendship for reasons of tactical principle, but because this 
friendship is real. 
The article by Hoffman and Koutcharian covers Kurdish-Armenian relations 
between from the fifteenth century until WWI. Much like Sasuni, on whose work they 
rely significantly, they focus primarily on Kurdish-Armenian relations within the context 
Armenian Review 4, no. 4-156 (Winter 1986), 3. Libaridian also includes some 
background information on Sasuni in Modern Armenia, 173-174. 
3
 My translation from the Turkish. Garo Sasuni, Kurt ulusal hareketleri ve Ermeni-Kurt 
iliskileri (15.yy'dan gunumuze) [The Kurdish National Movements and Kurdish-
Armenian Relations (from the fifteenth century to our day)], trans. Bedros Zarataryan and 
Memo Yetkin (Cagaloglu, Istanbul: Med Yaymevi, 1992), 224. 
4
 My translation from the Turkish. Ibid., 223. 
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5 
of the Armenian question and give the Kurdish question only a cursory glance.5 In a 
brief article on Kurdish-Armenian relations during the Sultan Abdiilhamid II period, 
Janet Klein explores explanations for both conflict and collaboration between Armenians 
and Kurds focusing on the question of land ownership and power at local levels as 
determinants of interactive behavior rather than state policy and "primordial hatreds" 
alone: 
Just as cooperation was not guided by ethnicity, neither was conflict shaped solely 
by communal concerns. Armenians were the primary targets because they had 
fewer protectors and could easily be denounced as traitors if they lodged a 
complaint against their aggressors. But Kurdish peasants and weaker tribespeople 
also fell victim to the same kind of violence, a fact that must be considered in this 
story of conflict.6 
This thesis seeks to carve out a space from the existing scholarship by looking at 
the shifts in traditional power structures within Kurdish and Armenian society, and the 
consequent transformations of identity and social structure, as key determinants of 
conflict and collaboration. In addition, it further takes a structural approach to analyzing 
Kurdish-Armenian relations. It identifies the existing power structures and political 
identities to which Armenians and Kurds were bound, explains the factors that shaped 
power and identity in these societies, and explores the reasons why such structures were 
mutually compatible or incompatible. 
This study recognizes religious and political institutions as the structuring 
properties that shaped Kurdish and Armenian society. It is assumed that ethnicity, 
culture, and religion cannot be understood without due consideration of the interaction of 
5
 Hofmann and Koutcharian, "The History of Armenian-Kurdish Relations." 
6
 Janet Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration: Rethinking Kurdish-Armenian Relations in 
the Hamidian Period, 1876-1909," International Journal of Turkish Studies 13, nos. 1&2 
(2007: 153-166), 166. 
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certain societal elites with the predominant political and normative structures of both the 
government and the respective social structures of societies. Ethnicity, culture, religion, 
and nation can be seen primarily as abstract notions to which elites appealed in order to 
legitimize their rule, attract followers, and enforce policy, rather than as fixed identities 
that determined behavior. Though both Kurdish and Armenian society had a degree of 
cultural, religious, and ethnic distinctiveness, the boundaries of ethnicity, religion, nation, 
and culture were reified through this process of interaction of actors with contemporary 
social and political structures. In this study Kurds and Armenians are seen not as 
ethnicities, cultures, or religions as much as groups of individuals tied to a single 
structure or a number of structures existing within a political framework. 
Periods of conflict and collaboration between Kurds and Armenians can be 
understood as composite rather than holistic. Kurdish and Armenian societies were not 
historically pitted against each other based on ethnicity, religion, culture, or national 
sentiment. Rather, the harmony or disharmony between them varied according to time 
and space. The factors that influenced Kurds and Armenians either to collaborate or be in 
conflict with one another can be explained by the interaction between a host of agents 
within the existing power structures both in the Ottoman government and in Kurdish and 
Armenian society, where social structures were reinforced and maintained as a result of 
Ottoman policy. 
Layout 
The layout of this study is as follows. Chapter 1 looks at the state of Kurdish-
Armenian relations before the rise of Sultan Abdulhamid II to power. Of particular 
interest in this chapter is the question of identity and social structure in Armenian and 
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7 
Kurdish society and how these relate to different internal and external factors. What 
differentiates a Kurd from an Armenian and how do their individual social and power 
structures differ from each other? How did the transformation of the policy of the 
Ottoman state affect power structures in Kurdish and Armenian societies? By analyzing 
the political geography of eastern Anatolia and the individual social structures present 
within Kurdish and Armenian societies, this chapter seeks to understand the role of 
ethnicity, religion, and culture in the Kurdish-Armenian relationship as it existed during 
the tanzimat period between 1839 and 1876. 
Chapter 2 looks at the effects of the Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin 
between 1876 until the mid-1880s. The two major question that this chapter attempts to 
answer are 1) the role of the policy and interaction of the Great Powers and the Ottoman 
administration in shaping and enforcing power structures in societies by analyzing the 
effect of the Russo-Turkish War and its aftermath (specifically Article 61 of the Treaty of 
Berlin) on Armenian-Kurdish relations and 2) the extent to which Kurdish and Armenian 
society were able to interact outside certain structures created and enforced both by the 
political and economic trends in the Ottoman Empire and by the existing power structures 
of their own individual elites. 
Chapter 3 examines the Kurdish-Armenian relationship during the conflict in the 
1890s. By exploring a host of European and Ottoman documents, a more subtle 
relationship between Kurds and Armenians than the conventional picture of continual 
conflict is revealed. The two most important political actors within Armenian and 
Kurdish society are considered here: the Armenian revolutionary parties and the Kurdish-
dominated Hamidiye cavalry. In order to understand the role that each entity played on 
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the Kurdish-Armenian relationship this chapter seeks to place these groups within the 
socio-political and normative contexts in the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian 
revolutionary parties, it is argued, arose in response not only to the Ottoman 
government's failure to implement the reforms affecting the Armenians which had been 
agreed upon under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, but also in response to the power 
struggle within the Armenian religious hierarchy. In essence, the parties appealed to 
ethnicity as a uniting factor among Armenians. The organization of the Hamidiye 
cavalry by the Ottoman government, which was designed to incorporate Kurds into the 
governing system, ended up having effects opposite of those which Ottoman 
administrators had intended: rather than dissolving power among the Kurdish tribes, it 
emboldened tribalism and fostered competition between them, thus resulting in political 
and social turmoil. Both the Ottoman government and the Kurdish tribal chiefs appealed 
to religion as a means of mobilizing power. The general trends in Armenian and Kurdish 
societies were going in opposite directions: Armenians were moving away from religion 
as a unifying factor, while Kurds were moving towards it. 
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CHAPTER 1 
KURDISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS 1839-1876: TRANSFORMATION 
OF TRADITIONAL POWER STRUCTURES 
The analysis of interactive behavior between two groups has tended to revolve 
around the structure vs. agents debate. Are trends in interactive political behavior more 
attributable to overarching political and social structures or to the agents acting within 
those structures? While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to flesh out an answer to 
this question, it is relevant to keep it in mind when analyzing social interactions between 
Kurds and Armenians. Is interactive political behavior between Armenians and Kurds a 
product of the individual structures in their societies and of Ottoman and global political 
structures which elite political figures have little impact on changing? Or do the actors 
themselves play a greater role in determining whether or not Kurds and Armenians 
collaborate or conflict? This chapter looks at the relationship between high level politics 
at regional and global levels and the power structures within Kurdish and Armenian 
society in order to determine whether structure or agents have great explanatory power 
for Kurdish and Armenian interactive political behavior. 
Identity, Structure, and Agency in Kurdish and Armenian Societies 
The interactive social and political relations between Kurds and Armenians in the 
late nineteenth century cannot be understood without discussion of the structural and 
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agency-related mechanisms of collective identity formation. Collective identification 
provides a basis for explaining conflict and collaboration, since it forms the fundamental 
element of group political formation and self-distinction. It can be defined as the basic 
unit of group cohesiveness based on shared social or cultural traits that manifests itself in 
interactive situations in which "the se l f and "the other" are identified. 
Collaboration and conflict based on identity (that is, not based on individual 
struggles) is rooted in groups' politically conscious perceptions of "the se l f and "the 
other." However, the integration of social, political, and cultural identity is not a 
precondition for the existence of extended social harmony. Instead harmony or 
disharmony among different groups is largely dependent upon, in the words of Alexander 
Wendt, "how deeply the social structures [which groups] instantiate penetrate 
conceptions of the self."7 Despite ostensible linguistic and religious differences, it cannot 
be said that Kurds and Armenians categorically regarded each other as outsiders and 
"others" socially, politically, and culturally. In fact there are many instances, as will be 
discussed later, in which Kurds and Armenians assimilated to each other culturally, 
religiously, and linguistically. 
As definitions of "se l f and "other" differed over time and space among Kurdish 
and Armenian society, it is most relevant in this study not to identify who Kurds and 
Armenians generally perceived as "the other," but to identify the factors that influenced 
the conceptions of collective identification. Was the interactive political and social 
behavior of Armenians and Kurds more a product of the social and political structures in 
which both groups were situated, or was their behavior more a product of the agency of 
10 
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11 
various actors? While the bulk of this favors the hypothesis that agency was ultimately 
more a determinant of political behavior than structure, structure cannot be dismissed as 
an irrelevant factor. It is indeed the agency of actors that leads to various political 
outcomes; however, structure limits the number of avenues that actors can pursue. For 
instance, the Kurds could not become politically conscious without the existence of a 
socio-political structure which fostered the growth of a bourgeois class. Yet it was the 
agency of the Kurdish actors to make choices from a range of possibilities that resulted in 
the rise of political consciousness among Kurds. 
Anthony Giddens' explanation of the relationship of structure and agency is 
fitting for the discourse about Kurdish-Armenian relations during the late Ottoman 
period. According to Giddens, there exists a duality in structuration in society according 
to which structure is "produced as an unintentional by-product of more concrete types of 
human activity. However, under some conditions it can be consciously steered and 
directed." Structure is neither inviolable nor permanent and is "both medium and 
outcome of the reproduction of practices." Furthermore structure "enters simultaneously 
into the constitution of social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this 
constitution."9 In Giddens' framework, identity in relation to structure emerges as both 
an intentional and unintended consequence of structure. Actors can consciously form and 
guide identities to the extent that they themselves are politically conscious. However, 
this does not mean that identity is purely the product of agency-driven social 
Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," The 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 386. 
o 
Giddens summarized in Charles Crothers, Social Structure (London: Routledge, 1996), 
54. 
9
 Anthony Giddens, Emile Durkheim (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 4. 
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54. 
 Anthony Giddens, Emile Durkheim (New York: Viking Press, 1979),4. 
12 
Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 26-27. 
1 1
 Ibid., 9. 
construction; instead, structure can have a more subtle role in shaping identity among 
those who are less politically conscious: "structure has no existence independent of the 
knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity.. ..Human 
history is created by intentional activities but is not an intended project: it persistently 
eludes efforts to bring it under conscious direction."1 0 Agency, on the other hand, "refers 
not to the intentions of people have in doing things, but to their capability of doing those 
things in the first place."1 1 
Giddens' analysis can be applied to the case of structures in Kurdish and 
Armenian society. For instance, the origins of the tribal structure in Kurdish society can 
be seen as the unintentional by-product of the need for protection in mountainous and 
barren terrain. However, the choices of actors were not guided by structure alone. 
Instead the tribal structure limited the options that tribal leaders could pursue as avenues 
to guide their tribes. Tribal leaders exercised the agency to ally themselves with or fight 
against neighboring tribes. However, the tribal structure in and of itself did not afford the 
tribal chiefs the option of participating in a social order beyond the tribe, such as civil 
society. Instead it was the intervention of agents both inside and outside the tribal 
structure, who had been influenced by other political and social structures, which could 
introduce ideas competing with those of the tribal leaders, thus leading to transformations 
in tribal society. The case of Bedr Khan, which will be discussed below, illustrates an 
instance of a tribal chief, influenced by ideas which he gained during his service in the 
Ottoman military and government, became an agent of transformation of Kurdish society 
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13 
in the Cizre region. 
The social and power structures in society are rooted more in the agency of actors 
than biological human behavior. It is ultimately the collective interaction of actors, 
through their agency, that determines power distribution in society and thus produces 
various social and political outcomes. A social structure can be understood as an 
arrangement of relationships with members of society that is operated through the power 
structures. The power structure is the agency space of actors in society to act politically. 
Those at the top of the power structure have the largest allotment of agency space and 
those at the bottom of the structure have the least. Those who transgress their allotment 
of power within the structure often cause conflict and rifts. The origins of power 
structures in society are predominantly a product of human agency. For instance, the 
structure of the Gregorian Armenian church was determined and maintained by the 
leaders of the church who devise policies as a means of organizing the society around 
them and ultimately maintaining power. Structures that operated outside that of the 
Gregorian Armenian church were tolerated so long as these did not interfere with the 
structure of the church. The structure of the Armenian business class, headed by the 
amiras, was tolerated by the Patriarchate, despite operating largely outside the church 
power structure, mainly because it provided the financial foundations for the church. On 
the other hand, the Protestant and Catholic power structures, which formed in Armenian 
society in the early nineteenth century, were not tolerated because these directly 
challenged the authority of the Patriarch. 
By the late nineteenth century the social structures of Kurdish and Armenian 
societies were no longer just basic family/clan structures whose members were generally 
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acquainted with each other; instead, the social structures included a substantial population 
whose identity was a product of identifications both from within and from outside their 
social structures. In order to maintain power, groups resorted to creating institutions for 
that purpose. Power in Kurdish society was originally maintained through the tribe, the 
leading aga acquired power by proving that the strength of his group was greater than 
that of others. However, in the course of the eighteenth century, sheikhs, the spiritual 
12 
leaders of Kurdish society, gained an increasing amount of powers. They legitimized 
their power by their ties to higher ranking religious authorities and, in some cases, even 
claimed to be descendants of the prophet Muhammad. Armenians, on the other hand, did 
not organize themselves in tribal defensive units like the Kurds. They had infiltrated the 
commercial networks of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires and many, though by no 
means all, had acquired a great degree of wealth. Power was maintained in Armenian 
society through wide-ranging connections with global and regional commercial networks 
and also through religious institutions. Since the eighth century, the Armenian Orthodox 
church was the leading authority over the Armenian people. Under the Ottoman millet 
system,1 3 the structure of the Armenian Church was not only maintained, but actually 
strengthened, since the Sultan granted the Patriarch full power over the Armenian millet. 
While it is clear that ethnicity among eastern Anatolian societies during the late 
Ottoman Empire did not have the same boundaries as it does today, the notion of ethnic 
distinction, nevertheless, was present in both Kurdish and Armenian society. Before the 
1 2
 See Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), 145-173. 
1 3
 A millet is a self-administrating non-Muslim religious groups throughout the Empire 
(i.e. Armenians, Greeks, Serbs, Slavs, etc.). The Armenians were the second largest 
millet in the Ottoman Empire after the Greeks. 
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rise of ethnic and nationalist consciousness among the members of their respective 
societies, the Kurds and Armenians can arguably be considered, in the words of Anthony 
D. Smith, ethnies, pre-national ethnocultural groups in which a type of ethnically-based 
identity existed which "tend[ed] to be exceptionally durable under 'normal' vicissitudes 
and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming 'moulds' within which all 
kinds of social and cultural processes.. .unfold[ed]." 1 4 The documents and writings of 
centuries past suggest that Kurds and Armenians have been collectively identified by 
outsiders and also have identified themselves for centuries as ethnically distinct groups. 
The preservation and propagation of their respective ethnies can be attributed to both 
religious and tribal institutions within eastern Anatolian society and to the parameters of 
Ottoman political culture. 
The boundaries of the Armenian ethnie reified as a result of a combination of the 
policies of the Gregorian Orthodox Church and the Ottoman administration. The church 
served to preserve the language and ethnic identity of the Armenians and also distinguish 
them from their Muslim neighbors and other Christian groups. The Ottoman millet 
system recognized a basic distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Based on the 
Islamic legal dhimmi statute—which granted Christians and Jews living within dar al-
islam (literally the domain of peace denoting the political area over which Muslims had 
control) certain political and economic privileges—the millet system granted non-
Muslims (Jews and Christians) the privilege to administer over their own people in 
judicial and religious affairs under a state-appointed milletbasi (head of the millet). The 
milletbasi of the Armenians was the Patriarch of the Gregorian Orthodox church who 
1 4
 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
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 Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26. 
1
 See Abdul-Kareem Rafeq, "Craft Organization, Work Ethics, and the Strains of 
Change in Ottoman Syria," in Journal of American Oriental Society 111, no. 3 (Autumn 
1991): 495-511. 
1 7
 Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya 
Gokalp, ed. and trans., Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 
130-131. 
1
 Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101. 
resided at Istanbul under the supervision of the Sultan. Gellner argues that the millet 
system had the indirect effect of giving the Armenians, like other non-Muslim groups, a 
sort of "ethnic specialization," which contributed to the perpetuation of their "ethnic 
distinctiveness,"1 5 although assimilationist trends were more common in the urban areas, 
particularly in the guilds, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.1 6 Ethnic 
distinctiveness appears to be more the result of the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth 
century, than a feature of the millet system. According to Ziya Gokalp (d. 1924), one of 
the leading ideologues of the Turkish nationalist movement in the early twentieth 
century, many Armenians and Greeks throughout the Empire, who had once been more 
assimilated to Ottoman culture, began to "revive their languages after they had been 
Turkified."1 7 The millet served mainly to preserve the power structures associated with 
the religion, than to produce ethnic nationalism directly. Ethnic nationalism rose outside 
the millet rather than within it. As will be later shown, the milletbasis of the Armenian 
millet during the late nineteenth century tended to be against nationalist groups. Islam 
was, as Gellner describes it, a "trans-ethnic" and "trans-social" religion: "it did not equate 
1 & 
faith with the beliefs of any one community or society." As the Kurds were 
predominantly Muslim (with pockets of them adherents of Yezidism and Alevism, both 
deemed heretical by Sunni Muslims) the Ottomans did not include them under the 
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umbrella of the millet system throughout most of their rule over eastern Anatolia, nor did 
they attempt to impose a certain ethnic identity or social practices on them. Instead, 
according to the law, the Kurds, as Muslims, enjoyed equal status with other Muslims 
throughout the empire. The fact that the Kurds identified themselves primarily according 
to tribe and lineage rather than ethnicity suggests that their ethnic identity evolved largely 
as outside themselves, an identity which Ottomans and Europeans used to identify the 
nomadic and pastoral peoples inhabiting eastern Anatolia, rather than self-identification. 
The Kurds were not only competing for power and resources along with other non-
Kurdish groups in eastern Anatolian society—including Nestorian Christians, Armenians, 
and Turks—for status in the Ottoman Empire, but also with each other. 
Given that the Armenians and Kurds have a long interactive history, it appears 
that in some areas they assimilated to an extent. In 1869 Consul J.G. Taylor of the 
British consulate in Erzurum reported that the Kurdish Mamakanlee tribe inhabiting the 
region around Erzurum believed themselves not to have emigrated from Diyarbakir, as 
had other Kurdish tribes in the region, but rather as being "descended from the Armenian 
Mamagonians, who are natives of the [Erzurum] soil."1 9 In 1914 S. Zarzecki echoed the 
notion that many of the Kurds were Armenians who had assimilated to Kurdish culture: 
When the Kurds were converted to Islam, many mountain-dwelling Armenians 
followed their example, embraced the faith of Muhammad, mixed with the Kurds, 
and thereby increased their number. This presumes that Armenian blood runs 
through the veins of a great number of these ferocious Kurds who have made the 
Armenians undergo such terrible suffering during the last twenty years of the 
reign of Abdulhamid. If one asks the Kurds themselves of their origin, they are 
quite uncomfortable and respond in an evasive fashion; some claim to be 
indigenous, while others assert that their ancestors come from Iran and are 
1 9
 Consul Taylor to the Earl of Clarendon, Erzeroum, March 19, 1869, in British 
Documents on Ottoman Armenians, ed. Bilal §imsir (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basimevi, 1982), 1: 62. 
  llet       
      
   
t  i   
      
      if  
      self-ide tifi
       
   iety-incl   
rks-     
     
      
         
       
         
 il.,,19  
      
   lli  
      
      
      
 ri g   
    
t l     
    
19      Briti
uments an enians,  ~ ~i   
l  
18 
My translation from the French. S. Zarzecki, "La question kurdo-armenienne," La 
Revue de Paris 21, no. 12 (March-April 1914): 881. 
Ertugrul Zekai Okte, Ottoman Archives: Yildiz Collection, The Armenian Question, 
(Istanbul, Turkey: Historical Research Foundation, Istanbul Research Center, 1989), 3: 
325. 
2 2
 Shahbazian's work cited at length in the Garo Sasuni. I have not been able to locate 
this document nor find any evidence that it was originally published in 1911 except in 
Libaridian, Modern Armenia: 179. 
2 3
 My translation from the Turkish. Celile Celil, XIX. Yuzyil Osmanli Imparatorlugu 'nda 
Kiirtler [Kurds in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire], trans. Mehmet Demir 
(Ankara: 6z-Ge Yaymlari, 1992), 131. 
blended with the Armenians who became Muslim; finally their chiefs and 
principally their shaykhs, who are numerous throughout their people, claim Arab 
descent.2 0 
A letter submitted to the Ottoman Sultan in 1884 by the governor of Van confirms 
the notion that Kurds in some regions were indistinguishable from Armenians: 
"[Reciprocal material and spiritual relations between the Armenians and the Kurds," 
claimed the governor, "are closer than their individual relations with other societies." 
The governor further reported that many Kurds claimed that they were of "Armenian 
21 
stock" and were often mistaken for Armenians by Ottoman officials. 
The idea that the Kurds and Armenians had a shared ethnic origin was certainly 
popular among the Armenian Dashnak party, whose members often appealed to the 
notion of a shared past with the Kurds as a means of gaining Kurdish support against the 
Ottoman administrators. Hagop Shahbazian, a sociologist and leading member of the 
Dashnak party, made the same claim in his book published Krda-hay patmutiune 
[Kurdish-Armenian History], published in Istanbul in 1911, 2 2 that the Armenians and the 
Kurds were of the same ethnic origin: "believe it or not, they [the Kurds and Armenians] 
are originally of the same blood, divided [only] by religion and tribe."2 3 Some of the 
Dashnak propaganda circulating throughout the region during the 1920s also emphasized 
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The idea that the Kurds and Annenians had a shared ethnic origin was certainly 
popular among the Annenian Dashnak party, whose members often appealed to the 
notion of a shared past with the Kurds as a means of gaining Kurdish support against the 
Ottoman administrators. Hagop Shahbazian, a sociologist and leading member of the 
Dashnak party, made the same claim in his book published Krda-hay patmutiune 
[Kurdish-Annenian History], published in Istanbul in 1911,22 that the Annenians and the 
Kurds were of the same ethnic origin: "believe it or not, they [the Kurds and Annenians] 
are originally ofthe same blood, divided [only] by religion and tribe.,,23 Some of the 
Dashnak propaganda circulating throughout the region during the 1920s also emphasized 
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the shared ethnic past of Kurds and Armenians. The following conversation between an 
Armenian agent and a Kurdish tribesman which was reported to a British Air Force 
intelligence agent in a memo from the Iraqi Police Criminal Investigation Department in 
1930 indicates the continuing spread of such propaganda: 
A Armenian agent): What is the difference between you and Armenians? 
K (Kurdish tribesman): religion 
A: What about nationality? 
K: None. As Kurds, Armenians and Yazidis are from the same origin, that is 
25 
Armenians. 
Not only did the Dashnaks maintain that the Kurds and Armenians had a common 
lineage, but the Young Turks were keen on the idea of peoples' shared ethnic pasts. 
According to Ziya Gokalp (d. 1924), Turkish tribes living in the rural areas of eastern 
Anatolia would become "Kurdified" and the Kurds in the urban areas of the cities would 
become "Turkified." Unlike the Dashnaks, however, the thrust of the argument of 
Gokalp and other leading Young Turks was to advocate that all ethnicities in the Ottoman 
Empire should unite by adopting a Turkish ethnic identity and thus abandon the ethnic 
nationalism that had been the source of so much political division. 
The rootedness of Kurdish and Armenian ethnic identity tended to vary according 
to the surrounding social circumstances. Whereas the assertion of Kurdiyeti 
During the late 1920s the Dashnaks offered to allow the Kurdish Khoybun party to 
assemble in their meeting houses in Beirut and communicate between individuals 
throughout Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Leaders of Khoybun and the Dashnaks would travel 
between Beirut and Eastern Turkey where it is very likely that they would spread 
propaganda among Kurdish tribes of a union between Armenians and Kurds. See 
Mohammad Mulla Ahmed, Jama 'iyat Khoybun wa al- 'Alaqaat al-Kurdiyya al-
Armaniyya [The Khoybun Society and Kurdish-Armenian Relations] (Bonn, Germany: 
Kawa Publishers, 2000), 133-146. 
2 5
 Cited in Nelida Fuccaro, "Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandatory Syria: Politics, 
Culture, and Identity" in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. Abbas Vali 
(Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 205. 
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(Kurdishness) tended to be stronger in rural regions where Kurdish tribal structure was 
dominant, the assertion of Armenianness tended to be stronger in urban areas where the 
Armenian Orthodox clergy and the wealthy Armenian amira class were dominant. 
Furthermore Kurdishness and Armenianness were not consistent throughout eastern 
Anatolia as ethnic identities. Based on its ethnic proportions, economic linkages, and 
natural geographic boundaries, eastern Anatolia was not an interconnected region, but 
rather a region forged through external political forces. Ottoman control over eastern 
Anatolia had always been rather limited. It conquered much of region in the early 
sixteenth century, but the Ottoman administration could implement long-term control 
only in certain areas, largely because the region's largely mountainous terrain made it 
difficult for government forces to control. In addition the fact that much of it was barren 
and infertile gave the Ottomans little incentive to invest in securing the few economic 
benefits that it had to offer. Hence Ottoman interest in eastern Anatolia was primarily 
geopolitical. As a means of staving off potential incursions from the Persians to the East 
and the Russians to the northeast, the Ottomans set up garrisons in a number of towns. 
Trends towards assimilation between the Kurds and the Armenians was to come to an end 
in the mid-nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire gained greater control of eastern 
Anatolia and implemented political mechanisms that distinguished between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. 
The Socio-Economic Geography of Eastern Anatolia 
It was in the Ottomans' interest to protect themselves against the threat of Kurdish 
tribal confederacies mobilizing any significant numbers against them. The Ottomans 
chose to invest enough administrative effort to place the plains regions of eastern 
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Anatolia under control, while allowing the more meddlesome and stronger Kurdish tribal 
confederacies to maintain relative autonomy. In areas in which Kurdish tribes were less 
powerful and more disparate the Ottoman government formed sancaks (an administrative 
division of the vilayet) in which Kurdish chiefs were allowed to serve as sancakbegis 
(heads of the sancak) under the supervision of government-appointed non-Kurdish 
beylerbegis. All necessary tax collection and military service administration controls 
were applied to the inhabitants.2 6 However, in regions where more powerful Kurdish 
tribal confederacies were dominant (typically regions which were more inaccessible), 
Ottoman administrative and military intervention was rare. Though keeping these 
regions under their suzerainty, the Ottomans allowed these more powerful Kurdish 
groups to form hukumets (governments) which were not subject to taxation or military 
service. Land ownership was dealt through local regulatory mechanism in accordance 
with Kurdish tribal administrative tradition. 
The protection afforded to some regions in eastern Anatolia by the Ottoman 
administration allowed for a number of trade routes to emerge. Eastern Anatolia became 
one of three main trading zones for the Ottoman Empire, connecting trade with the 
Persian Gulf region and the lands to the East to Western Anatolia and the Black Sea. The 
forests of eastern Anatolia provided lumber and the cities were major transit points for 
the silk and spice trades. 2 7 However, as trade with Europe gained in volume and 
importance during the nineteenth century, trade with the East diminished and the cost of 
van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, 159. 
2 7
 Mehmet Bulut, Ottoman-Dutch Economic Relations: In the Early Modern Period 
1571-1699 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001), 18. According to Bulut the other two trading 
zones in the Ottoman Empire were the "island-coast" and "Mediterranean-Indian 
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maintaining overland trade routes through harsh desert and mountainous terrain and 
maintaining security for them began to outweigh the benefit of trade with the East. The 
Trabzon-Tabriz route, which passed through Erzurum and Van, maintained its vitality on 
account of British interest in finding a shorter trade route to obtain silk from the Gilan 
region and the fact that Russia levied duties on goods passing through the Georgia trade 
28 
route. However, by the nineteenth century most of eastern Anatolia had become 
economically independent, and domestic trade was more important than trade with other 
Ottoman regions and international trade in terms of both volume and value. Regional 
trade became a significant means of subsistence for the inhabitants of eastern Anatolia. 
In 1890, the value generated by regional trade between Mosul, Diyarbakir, and Harput 
was equal to approximately 5 percent of the total export trade in the Ottoman Empire, 
which, given the relatively insignificant status of the cities in the Ottoman economy, is a 
remarkable figure. 
Geographically, eastern Anatolia consisted of four different types of settlements: 
cities, smaller towns, rural mountainous areas, and rural plains areas. The major cities 
and larger towns in eastern Anatolia were Diyarbakir in the west, Van in the east, and 
Erzurum in the north. These three cities served as the major economic centers of the 
region and had a strong Ottoman military and administrative presence. In an effort to 
outbid each other politically and protect their individual economic and geopolitical 
interest, the Russians, French, and British had assigned consuls to all three cities (with 
Oceans" zones, which were from the Aegean and lower Mediterranean coasts to Europe 
and the Red Sea to India respectively. 
2 8
 Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1970): 18. 
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Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 128-129. 
Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the 
Balkans to the Caucasus (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 131. In the 1860s the 
British and the French set up consulates in Van in order to counteract the Russian 
influence generated by the establishment of a Russian consulate not long before. 
Subsequently the British, Russians, and French maintained a more minor consular 
presence at Diyarbakir and Erzurum. 
1
 See Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern 
State (Leiden, Boston: E.J. Brill, 2004), 191-193. Also see Stephen Duguid, "The 
Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," Middle Eastern Studies 9, no. 2 
(Spring 1973): 155. The Kurds in Diyarbakir and Van were extremely influential on the 
the exception of the Russians at Diyarbakir) by the mid-nineteenth century. The 
Ottoman government maintained a strong administrative and military presence in all 
three cities, designating each one as the administrative center of the respective 
Diyarbakir, Erzurum, and Van vilayets and establishing each as a military base. The 
Ottoman military presence in Van functioned to protect the Empire from Persian 
influence and the military presence at Erzerum served to protect the Empire from Russian 
influence. At both Diyarbakir and Van the Ottoman army presence was instrumental in 
staving off major Kurdish and Armenian insurrections. In terms of ethnic composition, 
Van and Diyarbakir (and Erzurum to a lesser degree) consisted of a high number of both 
Kurdish and Armenian inhabitants. In order to rule Van and Diyarbakir, the Ottoman 
administration relied on many of the leading Kurdish families. As a result local politics 
were often rife with factional struggles for power between clans and families. In 1819 
the §eyhzade family, which had been gaining increasing power in Diyarbakir, for 
instance, was toppled by Ottoman forces which formed an alliance with Behram Pasa, a 
member of a rival Kurdish clan in the Diyarbakir region, who became the mutesarrif'of 
the Diyarbakir vilayet. 
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Ottoman administration. The effectiveness of Ottoman rule on the regions was largely 
dependent on the state of their relations with the predominant tribes. 
3 2
 Major Frederick Millingen, Wild Life Among the Koords (London: Hurst and Blackett 
Publishers, 1870), 149. 
Harry Finnis Blosse Lynch, Armenia, Travels, and Studies (Beirut: Khayats, 1965, 
originally published in 1896), 83. 
As the Ottomans began to establish a greater military and administrative presence 
in eastern Anatolia in the nineteenth century, an increasing number of Kurds migrated to 
the cities and the surrounding areas. These migrants to the cities tended to de-emphasize 
their tribal identity and even abandon their Kurdishness in some cases. Many Kurds 
dwelling in the cities of Diyarbakir, Erzurum, and Van in Eastern Anatolia attempted to 
flee the vicissitudes of the power struggles inherent in the tribal lifestyle. Frederick 
Millingen, who traveled in the region during the 1860s, wrote the following of the 
Muslims living in Erzurum, the majority of whom were predominantly of Kurdish origin: 
"if a stranger were to ask one of the native Mussulmans of Erzerum whether he is a 
Koord by nationality, the individual would undoubtedly consider the question an insult, 
as he claims to belong to what he supposes to be a higher caste."3 2 Harry Lynch observed 
that many Kurds settling in the city of Van, "disown[ed] the name of Kurds and 
affect[ed] that of Osmanli, or Turks of the ruling race." These Kurds, Lynch goes on to 
33 
say, "do not belong to any Kurdish tribe," or at least claimed that they did not. 
While the Kurds had a fair degree of control on the administration of the cities, 
the Armenians tended to control economic affairs. The guilds, trades, banks, and 
businesses in the cities of Van, Diyarbakir, and Erzurum were predominantly Armenian-
controlled. Kurdish feudal lords relied on Armenian traders for the purchase of 
     
      
 
   
 i   
   
   
t       
       
     
  ste.,,32   
     
] s h   
say, "do not belong to any Kurdish tribe," or at least claimed that they did not.
While the Kurds had a fair degree of control on the administration ofthe cities, 
the Armenians tended to control economic affairs. The guilds, trades, banks, and 
businesses in the cities of Van, Diyarbakir, and Erzurum were predominantly Armenian-
controlled. Kurdish feudal lords relied on Armenian traders for the purchase of 
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Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World War (London: Saqi Books, 
1994), 146. 
3 5
 Ibrahim Yilmazcelik, XIX. Yuzyihn Ikinci Yarisinda Dersim Sancagi: Idari, tktisadi ve 
Sosyal Hayat, [The Dersim Sancak in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: 
Administrative, Economic, and Social Life] (Elazig, Turkey, 1999), 147. 
"agricultural tools, other means of production..., and other necessities."3 4 By the time of 
Abdulhamid II eastern Anatolia had become more integrated into the capitalist market 
and had begun to use money as a regular unit of exchange. As the Armenians were 
traditionally well-versed in financial and economic matters, they became money-lenders 
to the Kurds, who were generally unacquainted with capitalism. The introduction of 
circulating currency into the region had a profound impact on social relations between 
Kurds and Armenians in many regions. In one case in 1893 in the Dersim region, one of 
the most economically and politically remote regions of eastern Anatolia, Armenian 
financiers managed to seize property from Kurds who had mortgaged their land in order 
to cover the expenses of the bride price and the wedding ceremony, which of course left 
the Kurdish tribes incensed at their creditors. 
Towns in eastern Anatolia were different from cities in that, while the population 
consisted of diverse groups, one group tended to dominate the local administration. 
Whereas the Ottoman government had a greater degree of control over the administration 
of the cities during the nineteenth century, and had parceled out administrative control to 
different tribes and groups, the administration of a number of towns was largely under the 
control of a dominant tribe. Among the towns of economic significance in eastern 
Anatolia were Bitlis, Mus, Harput, and Mardin, which had originally been largely 
Christian settlements which had become more inhabited by Kurds and Turks over time. 
While Harput remained predominantly Armenian, with Armenians dominating its 
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administration in addition to merely dwelling there, this appeared to be an exception to 
most of the towns in eastern Anatolia. The extent to which Armenians dominated 
political affairs in Harput can be seen in the fact that the Americans established a widely 
supported mission to benefit the Armenians. Bitlis, nestled in the mountains between on 
the West side of Lake and Northeast of Diyarbakir, had a mixed population of Arabs, 
Armenians, Jacobites, and Kurds. Wealth was generated by the numerous merchants 
who pass through on their way to Diyarbakir or Van and its population was sustained by 
the mountain pastures and agriculture in the fields towards Mus to the northeast. The 
extent to which the Kurdish mirs (leader of a semiautonomous principality) controlled the 
area can be seen in the portion of the taxes that they kept and they used to pay the salaries 
of many high-ranking Ottoman officials.3 7 In Mardin, the Ottoman administration still 
found itself forced to share power with the major Kurdish tribes, who continued to 
control the major means of production and distribution, even after the destruction of the 
38 
power of the mirs in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The rural mountainous areas of eastern Anatolia were difficult for Ottoman forces 
to penetrate. As such the inhabitants, who were mostly pastoral and seminomadic, had a 
strategic advantage over the invaders. The Ottoman administration typically exempted 
the inhabitants from taxes, military service, and the application of legal and 
administrative procedures. The isolation of the Dersim region, to the north of Diyarbakir 
3
 Edwin Munsell Bliss et. al, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities (Edgewood Publication 
Co., 1896). Here he talks about the invading redifs who were Turkish soldiers disguised 
as Kurds. 
van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, 162-170. The sources that van Bruinessen 
uses are largely from the seventeenth century traveler Evliya Qelebi. However much of 
the same structures appeared to be present until the mid-nineteenth century. 
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and southwest of Erzurum, was such that the Kurdish tribal inhabitants (in many cases 
referred to as the kizilbas) spoke a dialect (Zaza) which was completely different from 
other Kurdish dialects, and also maintained significantly different religious practices, 
most of them adhering to Alevism. The relationship between the Kurds and Armenians 
in Dersim was traditionally much closer than in other regions. Even during the 
tumultuous times under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the atrocities of WWI, 
pockets of the Dersim region (as the region was by no means ever unified under the 
control of a single tribe or individual) served as an area of refuge for Armenians fleeing 
conflict and deportation. It was reported that Kurds of Dersim provided a safe haven for 
more than 5,000 Armenians during the 1915 massacres. Armenians and Kurds in the 
Dersim region worshipped at many of the same holy shrines. Thus Kurds throughout 
Eastern Anatolia would make the pilgrimage to the Armenian monastery of St. John the 
Baptist (Surp Garavet Vank in Armenian) in the town of Khozat to be cured of diseases.4 0 
The Hakkari region, located to the south of Van was, much like the Dersim 
region, quite mountainous, although less isolated. Located on the trade route between 
Van and Urmia in western Iran, its inhabitants profited from collecting jamarik (customs) 
from traders passing through the region.4 1 The climate and soil of the Hakkari region was 
ideal for the growth of quality tobacco. By the beginning of the Abdulhamid II period, 
Shaykh 'Ubaydullah, a prominent Kurdish spiritual leader backed by many different 
3 8
 Suavi Aydin, Mar din: Asiret, Cemaat, Devlet (Istanbul: Turkiye Ekonomik Toplumsal 
Tarih Vakfi, 2000), 257. 
3 9
 Ahmad, 173. 
4 0
 L. Molyneux-Seel, "A Journey in Dersim," The GeographicalJournal 44, no. 1 (Jul., 
1914): 63. Molyneux-Seel writes that Kurds would continue to make such pilgrimages to 
the monastery during his visit to eastern Anatolia in the early 1910s. 
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tribes in the region, controlled the tobacco trade, even to the extent of rivaling the French 
tobacco company Regie. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Ottomans struggled 
to dislodge the control of the Kurdish tribes over the tobacco trade, which took away 
from the demand for French-cultivated tobacco. However, the mountainous terrain of the 
Hakkari region gave the tribes an advantage in protecting their tobacco and prevented 
Ottoman forces from intervening effectively.4 2 That of the villages scattered throughout 
the mountains in the Hakkari region were named after the predominant family and land 
ownership was not solely in the hands of Kurdish tribes. There were many instances in 
which Assyrian (Nestorian) tribes had control over Kurdish peasants in the region.4 3 
There were a number of relatively autonomously ruling elites in the areas of 
Zeitoun, north of modern-day Kahramanmaras, and Sasun, north of modern-day Batman. 
These were the mountain Armenians who were regarded as "patriot[s] and freedom 
fighter[s]" against the Ottoman Empire.4 4 According to Aghassi, a prominent Dashnak 
writer during the 1890s, the Zeitoun Armenians even helped the Ottomans fight the 
Kurdish rebels at one point in their history. 
While the Ottoman troops continued to be worn out by the Kurds in the other 
locations, the Zeitountsis, after having taken the fortress, attacked the Kurds from 
behind and made them suffer considerable loss.... The grand-vizier marveled at 
the ability and the bravery of the Zeitountsis and came up with the idea of 
forming an avant-garde regiment in his army to put down the rebellious tribes.4 5 
4 1
 Celil, Intifadat al-Akrad 'Am 1880 [The Uprising of the Kurds 1880], trans. Siyamand 
Sirti (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab Press, 1979), 24. 
4 2
 Ibid., 50. 
3
 van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, 118; David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, 
Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations during WWI (Piscataway, New Jersey: Gorgias 
Press LLC, 2006), 126. Rather than pay taxes, many tribes paid a small tribute to the 
Ottoman government in order to ensure their autonomy. 
4 4
 Libaridian, 75. 
4 5
 My translation from the French. Aghassi, Zeitoun: Depuis Les Origines Jusqu'a 
L'Insurrection de 1895 (Paris: Edition du Mercure de France, 1898), 103-105. 
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The status of both Kurds and Armenians living in the lowland rural areas was far 
from enviable. A saying circulated among highlander Kurdish tribes of the lowland 
villager Kurds: "Ta ji mirine cetire" (malaria is better than death). According to the 
explanation given by Ziya Gokalp, this meant that it was preferable to dwell in the 
mountains and may be exposed to malaria than to face the gruesome existence of lowland 
village life where people were exploited by tribes and Ottoman officials, seeking taxes 
and money. 
The Kurdish tribes were the predominant force throughout the rural lowland 
regions of eastern Anatolia. It was to the advantage of Kurdish peasants to ally 
themselves with a powerful tribe for protection from outside enemies and for economic 
security, but Armenian peasants were also dependent on the Kurdish tribes for protection. 
They paid the hafir tax which "consisted] of a certain portion of all their crops, cattle, 
silver, ore, with the addition of articles of clothing, agricultural implements" in exchange 
for the protection of the Kurds. 4 7 In addition to the hafir tax, the Armenians and peasant 
Kurds who were affiliated to a powerful tribe were to provide kislak, or winter quartering 
for Kurdish nomadic and pastoral tribesmen, which drew complaints from many 
48 
Armenian peasants to the European consuls and to the Armenian patriarchate. 
This feudal relationship between the Kurds and the Armenians was not entirely 
burdensome for the peasants; in some cases it was actually beneficial. Thus the 
4 6
 Ziya Gokalp, Kilrt Asiretleri Hakkinda Ictimai Tetkikler [Sociological Analysis of 
Kurdish Tribes], (Ankara: Komal, 1975), 85. 
4 7
 FO 424/183, Inclosure in No. 59, Therapia, August 15, 1895, p. 203, no. 192, Turkey 
no. 1 (1895) Part I, p. 132, no. 252, 252/1, British Documents, ed. $imsir, 4: 94. 
48 
Arshag Ohan Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question to 1885 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1938), 32-33. 
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University of Illinois Press, 1938), 32-33. 
30 
Armenians under the control of Mehmet Sadik of the Hayderanh tribe were actually quite 
wealthy. Even the poorest of the Armenians under the control of Mehmet Sadik, 
possessing at least a hundred sheep per farm, fared much better than poor Armenians in 
other regions. Mehmet Sadik, it should be noted, was not particularly kind towards 
Kurdish tribes and Armenians in other regions and was a notorious raider and 
plunderer.4 9 Yet as the Ottoman government began to centralize greater control over 
Eastern Anatolia and to collect taxes from the inhabitants, the hafir tax levied by the 
Kurdish tribes became increasingly burdensome. By the time of Sultan Abdulhamid II, 
powerful Kurdish tribal confederations were not completely dissolved, and continued to 
levy the tax to raise funds to counter the spread of Ottoman control in the region. As a 
result many Armenians and Kurdish peasants were double-taxed.5 0 The failure of 
Armenians to pay the hafir tax was frequently met with severe punishment. 
Typically, the Kurds and Armenians living in lowland rural regions had good 
mutual relations and relied on each other for defense against more powerful tribes. The 
Armenians of Eastern Anatolia were largely of the rayah class, a landless peasantry that 
was illiterate, uneducated, and generally detached from the Armenian clergy and business 
classes. The rayah were offered little support even from the clergymen of lower status 
who competed with them for prestige and access to sustenance from within the religious 
institution.5 1 
Whereas the identity of Armenians was strongly connected to religion, that of the 
Kurds was strongly connected to the tribe. Many Armenians in Western Anatolia did not 
4 9
 FO 195/2284, Dickson to Lowther, September 22, 1908, cited in Justin McCarthy et al, 
Armenian Rebellion at Van (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2006), 36. 
5 0
 Sarkissian, 33. 
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52 
Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of 
Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1963), 91. 
5 3
 See McCarthy, 50. 
speak Armenian. American Protestant missionaries in the Ottoman Empire requested that 
copies of Christian literature be published in Turkish for the Turkish-speaking Armenians 
in the West. One of the Tokat-based Armenian Altruistic Society's main functions in the 
1860s was to "hold Sunday classes in the Armenian language for Turkish-speaking 
Armenians."5 2 
The main unit of self-identification for most Kurds was the clan and the tribe 
rather than "Kurdishness" by itself, since the Kurds as a whole were divided both 
religiously and linguistically. While most Kurds were Sunnis, more specifically of the 
Shafi'i madhhab (which is more conservative than the Hanafi madhhab to which most 
Turks adhered), the Kurds of Dersim were Alevis, the Kurds in Iran were largely Shi'i, 
and many Kurds in the Mosul province were Yezidis. The Kurdish dialects of Kurmanci, 
Sorani, and Zaza were mutually incomprehensible. Yet there were frequent power 
struggles between tribes of similar linguistic and religious backgrounds. During the 
Sultan Abdulhamid II period the Shikak and Hayderanh tribes of Iran never managed to 
mobilize sufficient power to maintain an edge on their competitors. Within the Shikak 
tribal confederacy alone there were seven major tribes and numerous subtribes which 
regularly sought to dominate each other, although they would come together to compete 
with rival groups. McCarthy mentions that the "paramount chief of the Shikaks was 
most likely a weak leader overall.5 3 
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The Tanzimat and Kurdish Society 
The tanzimat were a series of reforms undertaken by the Ottoman administration 
from 1839 to 1876, aimed at centralizing control, industrializing the economy, and 
forming an official military. Ottoman defeat by the Russians during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries and Egypt's secession from the Ottoman Empire under 
Muhammad Ali—which culminated in Egypt's invasion of Syria in the 1830s —gave 
more liberal-minded administrators the upper hand in promoting such reforms. Sultan 
Mahmud II commenced the period of the tanzimat in 1839 with the declaration of the 
Hatt-i $erif of Gulhane (The Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber). The edict "abolished" 
tax-farming, reorganized the finance system, and civil and criminal codes, based on the 
French model, and reorganized the military, regularizing its method of recruitment and 
fixing the duration of service. Not all of the reforms, however, were actually put into 
practice. 
During the 1840s many of the powerful Kurdish beys were upset at the tanzimat 
reforms on the ground that it upset the "traditional" arrangements between the themselves 
and the state. Before the reforms, many Kurdish tribes had been exempted from paying 
taxes in exchange for keeping the peace and not interfering in the trade routes between 
the commercial centers of eastern Anatolian. The predominantly tribal structure in 
Kurdish society was one of two institutions through which Kurdish individuals could 
achieve power, status, and wealth. Beys and agas were the predominant land-holders, 
tax-collectors, and commanders of the Kurdish military force. As the village elder, the 
aga's influence did not usually extend beyond his tribe and village. The bey, on the other 
hand, tended to own much larger amounts of land and had stronger ties with a network of 
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See Van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh, and State, 81. The Kurdish aga is simply a leader 
of his village and people and is often poor and landless. The beys tended to function as 
the landholder, who derived his power from his networks and ties with the business and 
military classes. 
5 5
 Hakan Ozoglu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, 
Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2004), 53-59. 
5 6
 My translation from the Turkish. Nazmi Sevgen, Dogu ve Giineydogu AnadoluUda 
Turk Beylikleri: Osmanli Belgeleri He Kurt-Turkleri Tarihi [Turk Beyliks in Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia: Ottoman Documents and Kurdish-Turkish History] (Ankara: Turk 
Kulturunii Arastirma Enstitiisu, 1982), 63. 
agas and tribes.5 4 While the beys had been granted a functionally autonomous status by 
the Ottoman state between the sixteenth and the late eighteenth centuries, they would 
often forge alliances with key state officials against rival Kurdish beys.55 
As a result of the reforms, eastern Anatolia gradually became incorporated into 
the tax-collection system of the Ottoman state. Locals complained of the irregularity of 
its tax collecting methods; thus Bedr Khan, a prominent Kurdish bey who commanded 
the allegiance of several large tribes throughout the Bohtan (the area in between modern-
day Siirt and Cizre) and Hakkari regions, wrote in a letter to Ottoman administrators: 
"The Kurds' fundamental complaints are not that taxes are burdensome; rather, it is that 
taxes are not fixed and are subject to the whims of tax-collectors and officials. It is 
appropriate that the taxes be levied equally and be extracted according to the amount of 
one's property and possessions." He further complains that the local Kurdish beys were 
being replaced by official administrators as tax collectors. "The task of tax collection has 
been given to the mutesellims [state appointed regional officials in charge of tax-
collection]. They do not get things done equally, [even] to the point of forcing the people 
to rebellion."5 6 
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Hagop Shahbazian, Krda-Hay Tarihi (Constantinople, 1915), 86 cited in Sasuni, 71. 
CQ\\\,XIX. Yuzyil, 131. 
Doctor Lepsius cited in Ibid., 132. 
Bedr Khan 
It is widely believed that the ascent of the Kurdish bey Bedr Khan to power in the 
1830s stands as an instance of Kurdish national cohesion aimed at forming an 
independently ruling Kurdish state. For many Dashnak party members the period Bedr 
Khan's rule was an ideal time of peace and prosperity between Kurds and Armenians. 
Bedr Khan, it is believed, held "political independence as the highest priority" and 
"considered Armenians and Kurds on equal terms."5 7 Shahbazian, a member of the 
Dashnak party and an Armenian sociologist of the early twentieth century, asserts that 
Bedr Khan had close relations with the Armenians of his beylik (the domain of the bey) 
CO 
and to have "arranged" marriages between Kurds and Armenians. 
Dr. Lepsius, a German explorer of eastern Anatolia during the late nineteenth 
century, wrote the following in an article entitled "Kurds-Armenians" in a journal entitled 
The Christian East: 
Until 1848 the relations between the Kurds and Armenians were becoming 
increasingly friendly. There were many marriages between Armenians and 
Kurds. In these situations the marriage was conducted by the Armenian priest in 
the Armenian church and the Kurds acted with respect towards the Armenian 
clergymen and the monks and prayed in churches.5 9 
Perhaps in an effort to appease Bedr Khan, the Ottoman government appointed 
him commander of a brigade sent against Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt in 1839. Rather than 
meekly carrying out Ottoman orders, however, Bedr Khan used his position to gain more 
power over both the Kurdish tribes in the region and the Ottoman lands. His independent 
actions were deemed insubordinate by the Ottomans and he was dismissed from his 
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position. Subsequently he made appeals to the valis of both the Diyarbakir and Mosul 
provinces requesting that they annex the kaza of Cizre and recognize him as leader, but 
his appeals were declined.6 0 
Disillusioned with the Ottoman state, Bedr Khan turned his attention to the beylik 
of Hakkari for support, hoping to unite a force of Kurds and Nestorians against the 
central government. Nurullah Bey, who had usurped power from the former bey of 
Hakkari, allied himself with Bedr Khan. As Nurullah Bey had the support of Sayyid 
Taha, the leading Sufi of the holy city of $emdinan (southeast of Hakkari), the alliance 
was significant.6 1 One of Nurullah Bey's main concerns was that the tanzimat would 
allow the Nestorian Christian tribes, the majority of whom dwelt in the Hakkari region, to 
gain increasing power. As such he bade Bedr Khan to chastise the Mar Shimun, the 
religious leader of the Nestorians, and lead an attack against those Nestorian groups who 
refused to not ally themselves with the Kurdish force. Those Nestorians who backed 
Mar Shimon were killed in vicious attacks throughout the southeastern region. The Bedr 
Khan coalition gained strength during the early 1840s and managed to expand its control 
63 
over parts of Mosul, Diyarbakir, and as far as the borders with Iran by 1845. 
In an attempt to counteract the spread of Bedr Khan's influence the Ottoman 
authorities attempted to win over clans opposed to him by offering them positions in a 
newly created Kurdistan vilayet. In 1846 the grand vizier issued an irade (imperial order) 
that a separate Kurdistan vilayet be created comprising the "Diyarbakir province and 
6 0
 Sevgen, 67-70. 
6 1
 Ibid., 170. 
6 2
 Sarah Shields, Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2000), 55. 
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Van, Mus, and Hakkari districts and Cizre, Botan, and Mardin sub-districts." The vilayet 
was furthermore to be granted "special status and autonomy [idare-i mahsusa ve mustakil 
tahtina konulmasi\r However, the fact that in the same irade the grand vizier also 
named a strategic location (the town of Ahlat on the west side of Lake Van) where the 
"Kurds can better controlled with the iron fist [pence-i satvet]"64 reveals the Ottomans' 
ulterior motives in such a move. In fact, the vilayet of Kurdistan did exist from 1847 to 
1867, but it was ruled directly by the Porte and appeared to not be fully mustakil 
(autonomous) as proposed in the irade. By the mid-1860s the Porte undertook significant 
changes to its borders and eventually merged the vilayet of Mamuretulaziz with the 
Diyarbakir vilayet in 1868 and did away with the Kurdistan vilayet.65 
By 1847 Bedr Khan was forced to surrender and was subsequently exiled. While 
his removal marked the end of the beyliks, the Ottomans did not completely replace the 
Kurds' control with their own. In fact the Ottoman presence in eastern Anatolia only 
limited the degree to which the Kurds could mobilize through forming tribal 
confederacies and, Kurdish feudalism continued to be the dominant factor in the remote 
regions. That the Kurdish tribes continued to control much of eastern Anatolia is 
evidence of the failure of the Land Reform of 1858 end the control by powerful landlords 
and transfer land ownership to the peasant occupiers in eastern Anatolia, where the clause 
in the Land Reform that stipulated the creation of the tapu, title deeds given for peasant 
proprietors, had little effect. The peasantry was unaware of the changes and the tribes 
failed to comply with the law. Ziya Gokalp observed the following concerning eastern 
6 3
 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996), 45-47; van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, 178-180. 
6 4
 Hakan Ozoglu, Kurdish Notables, 60-61. 
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Anatolia: "although forms of zeamet like sipahilik, yurtluk, ocaklik have been formally 
legally abolished, they are in actuality and in fact still in existence."6 6 
The sheikh, the spiritual leader, filled the power vacuum in Kurdish society 
between 1848 and 1876. The increased Ottoman presence in eastern Anatolia made it 
difficult for any of the beys to emerge and form a powerful tribal confederacy like the one 
under Bedr Khan. Tribes became increasingly disunited, fighting each other for power. 
On the other hand the sheikhs, the religious leaders of the Kurds were unaffected by the 
Ottoman's centralization campaign and filled the power vacuum left by the decline of the 
beyliks. The sheikhs were not dominant in all of eastern Anatolia; rather, their power was 
limited to more isolated regions where there were no rival religious orders. According to 
McDowall: 
Shaykhly dynasties were most important in areas where tribes were most 
numerous and prone to feuds. Here they prospered on conflict resolution (and 
provocation) that made their own mediation skills indispensable. They were less 
influential in those areas either where there were still strong tribes, for example 
the Jaf, or where the area was basically non-tribal, for example the lands around 
Diyarbakir, and where consequently tribal conflicts requiring mediation either did 
not, or seldom, occurred. 
The sheikhs were especially powerful in the region of Hakkari. §emdinan, nestled 
in the mountains southeast of Hakkari near the border of Iran, served for centuries as the 
religious center for Kurdish followers of the Naqshbandi order. The holy families 
dwelling there claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad and commanded the 
allegiance of tribes throughout the southeast, even those who were at odds. Sevgen 
Ibid., 62. 
6 6
 Nur Yalman, "On Land Disputes in Eastern Turkey," in Islam and its Cultural 
Divergence: Studies in Honor of Gustave E. von Grunebaum, ed. Girdhari L. Tikku 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971: 180-218), 187. 
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 McDowall, 52. 
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38 
portrays $emdinan as a center for corruption where the sheikhs dwelt in luxury in the 
midst of the abject poverty of their Kurdish disciples. "Their bedrooms were covered 
with full length mirrors, and furnished with rugs to the walls." Although the Ottoman 
administration maintained a presence in §emdinan, the officials assigned to Hakkari and 
$emdinan had little recognition from the locals. Moreover many of them were venal and 
accepted bribes. According to Sevgen the religious leaders would prepare daily meals for 
the kaimmakam and other leading officials.6 9 Hakkari became the center of Kurdish 
resistance during the 1870s and 1880s under the leadership of Shaykh 'Ubaydullah as 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Following Bedr Khan's deposition in 1847, military security posed a problem for 
eastern Anatolia. As the Ottoman forces could not afford to maintain conscript regiments 
throughout the rural parts of the region to patrol the villages, ensure tax collection, and 
recruit soldiers; they became increasingly reliant for security on basibozuks (irregular 
forces). Throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire sought to take measures 
to modernize its military. It dissolved the Janissary corps in 1826 and sought to 
implement a system of conscription modeled along European lines. While the Ottomans 
may indeed have preferred to use basibozuks as a means of minimizing the potential of 
the military to seize control from the state, the system in eastern Anatolia was highly 
ineffective. Unlike local militiamen and regular military regiments, basibozuks could 
clear the battlefield with hardly any repercussions. The weapons that the Ottomans 
distributed among the Kurdish basibozuks went unaccounted for and served as a means 
for Kurds to undertake feuds and vendettas against their rivals. Christians also suffered 
6 8
 My translation from the Turkish. Sevgen, 170. 
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1861), 37. 
severely as a result of raids by unruly nomadic Kurdish brigand groups, many of whom 
were loosely connected to the Ottoman military as basibozuks. One observer said the 
following of the basibozuks: "they are.. .restless, turbulent, and impatient of discipline; 
and, like the members of that fallen corps, are a bad specimen of the soldier and the 
citizen."7 0 
While the Ottomans could easily employ Kurds as irregulars, it was difficult to 
maintain their allegiance. By and large the Kurdish basibozuks paid more allegiance to 
their own individual tribes than to the Ottoman state. Accompanying a group of Kurdish 
basibozuks headed by a French captain, Noe, on route to Bulgaria in 1854 was a female 
religious leader (sheikha) whom Noe reported to be in her seventies. As she enjoyed 
particular religious prestige among the Kurds, the Ottoman and French leaders of the 
regiment found themselves needing to win her respect in order to be able to command the 
other Kurds. At one point in the journey the Kurdish shaikha became upset over a 
French officer, Capitaine de Serionne, drawing a sketch of her, and abandoned the 
71 
regiment with her Kurdish followers in following weeks. 
The Tanzimat and Armenian Society 
As far as the Armenian millet was concerned, the tanzimat reforms had the 
unintended consequence of weakening the traditional power structure among the 
Armenians, which had been crucial in keeping the Armenian subjects in line with the 
         
   ~lb .  
  ~lbo u s:   .   
     
 ." 70 
   lt 
   ~lbozuks  
   
~lbozuks    f
 i ha)   j
    
       
    ikha    
r,      
regiment with her Kurdish followers in following weeks. l
i at  
 llet zi at nn  
      
      
69 Ibid. 
70  i  ire: l tions  istianity  Civilizati
 
71 enirs frique  ient: s hi-Bozouks 
seurs frique:  lerie uliere agne 
),
40 
Ottoman state. This opened up political space for other segments of the Armenian 
population, especially those who were not tied to the clergy or the amira class, to emerge 
and arouse the consciousness of the Armenians throughout the empire of the injustices 
which they suffered. In 1856 the Ottomans undertook another series of reforms issuing 
the Hatt-i Humayun (Imperial Rescript) which abolished the cizye tax on non-Muslims 
and allowed them to serve in the military. This part of the tanzimat reforms, which came 
about largely as a result of pressure from Britain and France to liberalize policies related 
to non-Muslims in exchange for their help in the Crimean War, led towards the 
reformation of the millets and of the traditional Armenian power structure. 
Traditionally, as has been mentioned, the Ottoman state administered the non-
Muslim groups through the millet system which allowed the milletbasis (head of the 
millet) to administer their own millets injudicial and religious affairs. The head of the 
Armenian millet was the Patriarch of the Gregorian Armenian church who was appointed 
by both the Sultan and the Armenian amira class (nobility) and was given nearly 
unchecked authority over the Armenians. While Kurdish religious figures were filling 
the political vacuum that the Ottomans had created since the ending of the power of the 
beys, the Armenian patriarchate's power over the Armenian people was becoming 
increasingly limited. In the first place European missionary infiltration into the Ottoman 
Empire had led to the conversion of numbers of Armenians to Protestantism and 
Catholicism who were subject to persecution by the Gregorian Armenian Orthodox 
clergy. At the behest of the British Ambassador the Ottoman Empire created separate 
millets for the Armenian Protestants in 1847 and the Armenian Catholics in 1850, 
ensuring them protection from the hostility of Orthodox Armenians and placing them 
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 Vartan Artinian, The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire: A Study 
of Its Historical Development (Istanbul: 1988), 64-65. 
outside the jurisdiction of the Gregorian Orthodox millet. In addition groups of 
Armenians both inside and outside the Ottoman Empire began to put forward 
philosophies that advocated the redistribution of power in the Armenian millet. Inspired 
by the bloodless revolution of 1848 in France, a group of Armenian intellectuals in Paris, 
known as the Young Armenians, put forward the notion of an Armenian nation and 
advocated the creation of school curricula that promoted the Armenian language and 
73 
sought to instill the Armenians with a sense of their own ethnic identity. With the 
division between the Armenian Orthodox clergy and the Protestant and Catholic 
Armenians, the ideas put forward by the Young Armenians served as a means of 
cohesion between the conflicting groups within the Armenian millet. What had begun as 
a literary and linguistic movement under the auspices of the Young Armenians, the 
Araratean Enkerut'iwn (Ararat Society), eventually grew to encompass political and 
social matters. During the 1850s and 1860s the Armenian community, which had fallen 
into considerable social disorder on account of its fragmentation into three separate 
millets, felt the impact of liberal ideas of the Young Armenians. By 1863, a group of 
enlightened liberal Armenians introduced an Armenian Constitution, which redistributed 
the power within the Armenian millet, allowing middle-class Armenians to have a role in 
the election of the patriarch and legislative assembly. The constitution expanded the 
accountability to which the patriarch was held, and elements of Armenian society, other 
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than the nobility and the clergy, were now able to play a role in politics.7 4 
Though the Ottoman state clearly intended the millet groups to have greater 
representation in the administration through administrative assemblies, thus supplanting 
the absolute control of the patriarch or other religious authority, it was hoped that 
allowing greater freedoms would ultimately stem resistance or separatist movements. In 
fact, the reforms did not achieve the initial ideal of creating an 'Ottoman' identity to 
replace the former millet identity. Horizontal alignment based on class could not vertical 
alignments based on ethnic and religious identification. 
Until 1860, the Armenian patriarch in Istanbul had nearly absolute authority over 
Gregorian Armenian religious and social affairs. Granted the rights of tax collection (a 
function to which he appointed many of the upper-class amira families), property 
administration, control over religious and secular education, control over the tribunals 
and courts, and the right to censor publications in Armenian, he was the main link 
between the millet and the Ottoman administration. As he also maintained the right to 
exile and to execute Armenians insubordinate to his rule, he was widely feared in the 
Armenian community.7 5 However, upon millet reform the patriarch's power over the 
Armenian millet became severely limited, in both temporal and religious affairs, although 
here his power was maintained to some degree. He was able to continue to enforce the 
rule that Armenians who did not fast during the week before Easter receive twenty-five 
lashes.7 6 
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Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1990), 100-102. Aziz Pasha's engagement in morally reprehensible military 
tactics of burning houses and raping women spurred the Ottoman state to dismiss him. 
The Zeitoun inhabitants and clergy sent a delegation to both Istanbul and Paris to appeal 
for intervention. Ultimately the Turkish military blockade of Zeitoun was lifted in 
exchange for the establishment of a military base. Also see Barsoumian, "The Eastern 
Question," 200-201. 
The restructuring of power through the millet reforms was also coupled with 
resettlement measures in the Eastern provinces. While the Ottoman state, following the 
Crimean War of 1853, eventually came to the realization that its aim to maintain control 
over the Balkans would be untenable in the long run, it sought to strengthen its position 
in eastern Anatolia. The eastern Anatolian project aimed to place all Armenians under 
the control of the administrative council and dissolve the dissenting power blocs. Zeitoun 
was one particular area in which Armenians enjoyed relative autonomy, and suspicions of 
revolutionary activity spurred the Ottomans to undertake a resettlement campaign under 
which land in nearby villages was given to Circassians and Turks in an effort to weaken 
potential resistance. The continuing activity of Armenians, the amassing of weapons, tax 
evasion, and minor disputes with non-Armenian locals during the early 1860s, gave the 
then governor of nearby Marash, Aziz Pasha, the pretext to intervene with his army, loot 
and pillage Armenian lands, and establish a military base to keep the area under state 
77 
control. 
By the 1870s, the fonnerly "uncaring" wealthy Armenian business class in the 
urban areas of Western Turkey was becoming increasingly aware of the situation of the 
Armenian peasants in eastern Anatolia. Increased ethnic awareness among Armenians 
was largely due to the efforts of Mkrtich Khrimian, a clergyman and activist from Van 
who sought to disseminate information about the plight of the eastern Anatolia 
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Armenians among the Armenian elite. Through the Artsvi Vaspurakan (The Eagle of 
Vaspurakan) newspaper in 1855 and later the Artzvik Tarono (The Eaglet of Taron) in 
1862, he was influential in drawing attention to the treatment of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire. Increasing social awareness among the Armenian elites, coupled with 
the growth of political and national/ethnic consciousness among young Armenians 
-70 
largely as a result of the growing number of Armenian schools in Turkey, contributed to 
the rapidly spreading internationalization of the Armenian Question. Britain and Russia 
established consulates in Diyarbakir, Erzurum, and Van during the 1860s and 1870s both 
asa geopolitical strategy of preventing each other from gaining greater hegemonic control 
and also as a means of monitoring Ottoman treatment of the Armenians. 
With the Ottoman administration was becoming increasingly encumbered by the 
number and force of the secessionist movements in the Balkans, administrators 
sympathetic to the Christian minorities were becoming fewer in number and losing 
support within the higher ranks of the Ottoman government. In the face of losing 
significant portions of territory and bankruptcy, proponents of liberalization through the 
tanzimat reforms were forced to take more stringent attitudes towards reforms which 
benefitted the minorities. The passing of Ali Pasha in 1871, one of the most influential 
figures behind Ottoman liberalization extinguished the hopes of many activists concerned 
with achieving greater rights for eastern Anatolian Armenians. In 1872 and 1876, the 
Armenian National Assembly's appeals to the Ottoman government to lighten 
burdensome taxes, provide protection from marauding Kurdish tribes, dissolve the feudal 
system under which many Armenians lived, provide greater recognition for non-Muslim 
no 
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 Due to the paucity of sources, this analysis of eastern Anatolia during the 1850s and 
1860s is largely speculative. 
testimony in courts, and other matters stipulated in the tanzimat reforms were largely in 
vain. The further suggestion that criminal and commercial cases be placed in the hands 
79 
of separate Armenian courts received no response. 
The tanzimat reforms significantly affected patterns of interaction between 
Annenians and Kurds. It weakened the power structure in Kurdish society, leading to 
increased rivalry for power between Kurdish tribes, which in turn worsened the plight of 
the Armenian peasants who perished in the crossfire. The Ottoman Empire's millet 
reform had the paradoxical effect of creating political space for a new Armenian class to 
achieve power by overturning the traditional power structure of Armenian society. The 
tanzimat never fully achieved its aim of centralizing administrative control over eastern 
Anatolia. Kurdish tribes and the Ottoman state continued to share power throughout the 
1850s and 1860s, albeit with the Ottomans increasing their control. Despite the 
continued presence of nomadic tribal Kurds and feudalism throughout eastern Anatolia, 
Kurdish identity experienced a major transformation. However, the tanzimat reforms 
prevented the emergence of a strong representative of Kurdish ethnic identity to extend 
his influence far beyond his own tribe, and actually fostered the fragmentation of Kurdish 
identity. The tanzimat reforms left an enduring political vacuum in eastern Anatolia 
during the 1850s and 1860s which, in part due to the tenuous Ottoman presence, no 
significant figure could fill. 8 0 
Overall Kurdish-Armenian relations began to deteriorate significantly as a result 
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of the centralization of Ottoman control in the region and the consequent weakening of 
the power structures in Kurdish and Armenian society. One of the major problems of the 
tanzimat reforms was that they were generally weak and ineffective in eastern Anatolia 
and could not provide the security enforced by the Kurdish beyliks which had kept the 
region relatively peaceful. Consequently a power struggle ensued between various 
Kurdish tribes ensued, which destabilized the region. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, ITS AFTERMATH, 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON KURDISH AND 
ARMENIAN SOCIETY 1876-1882 
The Russo-Turkish War and the subsequent Treaty of Berlin (1877-8) was a 
critical moment for Kurdish-Armenian relations. From one angle the war and the treaty 
appeared to divide the Kurds and the Armenians, since many Kurds fought on the 
Ottomans' side while many Armenians fought on the Russians' side. The settlement of 
the war at the Congress of Berlin resulted in the independence of several predominantly 
Christian regions in the Balkans and sparked increasing Armenian nationalist sentiment. 
It is not clear whether the war and the Treaty of Berlin were catalysts for division 
between the various Armenian and Kurdish factions. In Kurt Ulusal Hareketleri Garo 
Sasuni makes the assertion that the war and its settlement caused an unprecedented divide 
to come into being between the Kurds and the Armenians which the Armenian 
revolutionaries, despite their efforts, were unable to fill.8 1 Enver Ziya Karal, founder of 
the state-sponsored Turkish Education Association (Turk Egitim Dernegi) in 1961 and 
dean of Ottoman historians, goes as far as to assert that the "Armenian Question" did not 
exist before to the ascension of Abdul Hamid II in 1876. Hostility between Armenians 





    
 i  
 
    
c c     
   
c  c    
  rt l ketleri 
   
             
, c   ,    ll. sl   ,   
t  t t  i  ti  i ti   iti  cm i  i    
 f tt  ist ri s, s s f r s t  ss rt t t t  r i  sti  i  t 
e ist ef re t  t e asce si  f l a i  II i  . stilit  et ee  r e ia s 
a  sli s, e asserts, ar se as a irect res lt f r e ia  litical rt is  
48 
1
 Sasuni, 94-97. 
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 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanh Tarihi, Vol. VIII (Ankara, 1962), 126. 
following the Treaty of Berlin. This chapter reassesses the effects of the Russo-Turkish 
War 1877-8 and the Treaty of Berlin on Armenian-Kurdish relations. 
The Russo-Turkish War 1877-8 
By the mid-1870s the Ottoman sultanate was reeling back and forth in the 
diplomatic tug-of-war between Western Europe and Russia. Intent on gaining back 
territory that it had lost during the Crimean War, Russia was encouraging Balkan 
nationalism. With the help of a number of Russian volunteers, Serbia and Montenegro 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire on June 30, 1876. Desperate to cling onto the 
Balkans, the Ottoman forces launched an offensive deep into Serbia to undermine the 
resistance. By October a Russian ultimatum persuaded the Ottomans to cease military 
action and sign a truce with Serbia. Although the Ottomans were capable of defeating the 
Balkan separatists, the stronger hands of Russia and Western Europe prevented the 
Ottomans from achieving a political victory. In December Western European and 
Russian officials met to work out a political comprise in which Bulgaria and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would become autonomous under joint European control. On December 23, 
1876 the Ottoman Empire announced its rejection of the agreements reached over the 
Balkans by declaring a Constitution that recognized the equal rights of non-Muslims. 
After the failure of the Ottomans to comply with Russian demands for reform in the 
Balkans in ensuing months, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 
1877. 
The war of 1877-8 was hugely damaging for the Ottoman Empire. Although the 
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The British consul of Erzurum began sending out warning signals that the Russians 
would penetrate deeper into the east. New York Times, May 25, 1877. 
8 4
 Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms 1812-1914" in Halil Inalcik and Donald 
Quataert, eds., The Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 1600-
1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 790. 
Ottomans had a technological advantage on the Russians, since they had British military 
equipment, the Russian forces outnumbered the Ottomans nearly three to one in the 
Balkans and four to one in eastern Anatolia. In the west Russia managed to capture the 
Balkans and advance its armies deep into Thrace in the direction of Istanbul before 
Britain intervened at San Stefano (modern-day Yesilkoy), a village just west of Istanbul, 
and urged the Russians to declare a truce and sign a treaty. In the east, in the Caucasus, 
the Ottomans fared somewhat better against the Russians, although the Russians had 
taken Bayazid, Ardahan, and Kars by mid May. By the end of May, they proved 
themselves against all odds by liberating Kars and keeping the Russians from taking 
Erzurum.8 3 In July the Ottomans launched a counteroffensive in Ajaria where they dealt 
the Russians a heavy blow. 
The global financial crisis of 1873 had severely affected the Ottoman Empire. 
The reverberations of the "international financial panic" of the 1870s were felt deeply in 
eastern Anatolia. With low returns on agricultural produce, increasing taxes, and the 
sense of imminent war in the early and mid-1870s, the farmers and peasants who tilled 
the eastern Anatolian soil had little security of tenure.8 4 Economic hardship forced many 
Kurds and Armenians to abandon their villages and migrate eastward towards Russia in 
search of greater economic stability. Massive out-migration to Russia aroused fears 
among Ottoman officials, already bracing themselves for a widespread separatist outburst 
in the Balkans, that similar social movements would arise in the east. According to the 
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Russian consul in Erzurum, the Pasha of Erzurum commissioned the kaimmakam of 
Basin to personally visit surrounding villages in the Erzurum vilayet to obtain signatures 
from the migrants affirming their loyalty to the sultanate and asking for their eventual 
return to Turkey. The Armenians of Basin adamantly refused to sign the form. 
Russia had an advantage against the Ottoman Empire in its ability to gain the 
support of the Armenians. Russia's appeal for the enforcement of Christian rights and 
liberties in the Ottoman Empire certainly drew many Armenians to its side. During the 
1870s many Armenian peasants, then under the heavy burden of Ottoman taxation, 
eagerly anticipated a Russian invasion. In a visit to the Erzurum region in 1869, Consul 
Taylor reported that an Armenian village representative in one instance mistook him for a 
Russian consular official and declared that "he and all his flock were anxious at once to 
become loyal subjects of the Czar, and ready to do his bidding in the event of any future 
war." 8 6 Yet Russia also had an advantage over the Ottomans in attracting Armenians to 
their side in that a large percentage of the Armenian population dwelled in Russian 
territory in the Caucasus mountains. Prominent Caucasus Armenians Beybut 
Shelkovnikov, Mikhail Loris-Melikov, Ivan Lazarev and Arshak Ter-Ghukasov, all 
served as generals in the Russian army.8 7 A number of Armenian revolutionaries based 
in Tiflis (Tblisi in Georgia) voiced their outright support for banding together with the 
Russians. The Tiflis-based Armenian newspaper Mshak stated: "if Turkey vanishes from 
the face of the earth as a nation, the Armenians of Turkey must try every means to join 
o c • • • 
Foreign Policy Archives of Russia, the Russian Consulate in Istanbul, 1873, Division 
517 Doc. 732, p. 59 cited in Celil, Intifada, 27. 
8 6
 Inclosure in No. 25, March 18, 1869, Turkey No., 16 (1877), p. 16-36, no. 13/1, in 
British Documents, ed. $imsir, 1; 56. 
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51 
Victor Hambartsumyan, "The Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878," vol. 10 of Soviet 
Armenian Encyclopedia (Yerevan, 1984), 93-94. 
Nalbandian, 53. 
8 9
 Sadi Kocas, Tarih boyunca Ermeniler ve Turk-Ermeni Iliskileri [Armenians and Turco-
Armenian Relations Throughout History] (Ankara, 1967), 75, cited in Salahi Ramsdan 
Sonyel, The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy (London: K. 
Rustem & Brother, 1987), 43. 
9 0
 Hakki Tank Us, Meclis-i Mebusan, 1293-1877, I, 170-1, cited in Sonyel, 43. 
Russia."8 8 
It was not in the interest of all Armenians to side with the Russians. Many 
Armenians enjoyed high positions in the Ottoman state and relied on the maintenance of 
the Empire's integrity in order to maintain their status, and feared Russian intervention 
would disrupt the existing social structure. According to one report, upon hearing the 
news that the Russian Ambassador Ignatiev had issued an ultimatum to the Ottoman 
government, the Armenian Patriarch swore his allegiance to the sultanate in the event of 
war: "if this great state is destined to be demolished, we consider it our duty to be buried 
OA 
under its ruins." This sense of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was shared by a host of 
other Armenians in high-ranking positions. On the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War 
on April 25, 1877 Manon Efendi, the Armenian deputy for Aleppo, stated: "We, the 
Armenian Christians, wish to announce that we do not need the protection of Russia.... 
We never deserted our Muslim friends, nor can we desert them now." 9 0 
The Ottomans and the Russians struggled for the loyalty of the Kurds. Most 
Kurds in eastern Anatolia were primarily interested in either gaining or maintaining the 
upper hand against rival tribes in the region. According to Colonel Henry Atwell Lake 
the Kurdish basibozuks, tribal leaders, and religious sheikhs, were "at all times ready to 
enlist under the banner of those who possess the means and the inclination to pay 
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them."9 1 The Russians were well aware of the need to forge an alliance with the Kurds. 
The Russian Consul Avreyanov wrote to the Czar: "It is necessary for the leadership of 
the Caucasus to win over the Kurds and establish secret connections with them as in past 
wars, otherwise it will be easier for the armed Kurdish populace to be flattered by the 
92 
Turkish administration and the tricks of the English in fighting against us." 
In the mid-1870s the Ottomans had launched a campaign to subdue the tribes of 
Dersim in hope of expanding their tax and military bases. Samih Pasha was 
commissioned to go to Dersim in 1875 for the purpose of winning over a number of 
Kurdish tribal leaders to the Ottoman cause. His recruitment campaign among the tribes, 
however, was met with fierce resistance by the Kurdish religious class, which had 
infiltrated tribal politics to a great degree. Sheikh Suleiman Pasha managed to mobilize a 
formidable force of 12,000 soldiers, the militias of numerous tribes, against the Ottoman 
forces. Aligning himself with the Russians he accumulated a large supply of weapons 
with which his forces were able to withstand the Ottomans. However, his force was 
93 
eventually routed and he was exiled. 
The conflict in Dersim was a graphic revelation for the Ottomans that in the 
advent of war with Russia, the Kurdish tribes could be a thorn in the side. However, the 
most effective way for the Ottomans to overcome potential widespread Kurdish 
collaboration with the Russians was to forge alliances with the Kurdish elites rather than 
put further political impositions on them. The Ottoman strategy was to entice influential 
Kurdish leaders to side with them against the Russians by offering them positions in the 
9 1
 James J. Reid, Crisis in the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse: 1839-1878 (Franz 
Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 2000), 159. 
General Avreyanov, cited Celil, Intifada, 33. 
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^ Ibid., 30-31. 
9 4
 Sevgen, 119. 
9 5
 My translation from the Turkish. Muzaffer Ilhan Erdost, gemdinli Roportaji 
(Yenisehir, Ankara: Onur Yaymlan, 1993), 161. 
state administration, tax-exemptions, and wealth. The Ottomans managed to gain the 
support of three of the sons of Bedr Khan, Huseyin Kenan Bey, Ali $amil Bey, and Bedri 
Bey, who gathered a volunteer force of Kurds from Adana, Istanbul, and Syria totaling 
approximately 3800 and persuaded several Kurdish sheikhs in eastern Anatolia to fight 
with the Ottomans.9 4 
Perhaps most significantly, Ottoman officials also won the allegiance of the 
prominent religious leader Shaykh 'Ubaydullah by appointing him as the leader of a 
Kurdish tribal force. This brief alliance with this sheikh was no small matter. 
'Ubaydullah hailed from the holy Kurdish city of Nehri nestled in the Kandil mountains 
in the Hakkari region. He was a member of the prestigious $emdinan family that had 
enjoyed high-ranking religious status among the Kurds of the Van and Hakkari regions 
during the nineteenth century. Claiming descent from the prophet Muhammad, 
'Ubaydullah established his spiritual legitimacy before thousands of Kurds. As the 
leading religious figure of the Naqshbandi Sufi order in the Van region he "formed an 
administrative establishment that is above the tribes" and enjoyed the loyalty of 
numerous tribal leaders, many of whom were at odds with each other.9 5 Not only did he 
acquire wealth through donations from his followers, but he also dwelled in one of the 
few regions where the Armenians did not have the upper hand in trade and commerce. 
The Kurds in Hakkari dominated tobacco production and trade. In consequence, 
'Ubaydullah amassed sufficient revenue to purchase large tracts of land in many parts of 
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eastern Anatolia and Iran.9 6 
Stridently aware of the possibilities of obtaining high ranking positions in the 
Ottoman state by offering his loyalty, 'Ubaydullah eagerly accepted the position of 
militia leader. His appointment was a historic moment for the Kurds, whom the 
Ottomans had been avidly seeking to subdue and divide throughout the 1860s and 1870s. 
Jwaideh writes, "certainly, [the] appointment [of 'Ubaydullah] left no investiture, 
conferring upon him what had been denied to any other Kurd since 1847." 
As Shaykh ' Ubaydullah's authority only extended to certain tribes in certain 
regions, he was unable to call upon the nomadic tribes to cease the violence. Moreover 
he was involved in other engagements with his militia. According to Seyit Islam 
Geylani, one of his recruits, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah led a militia of some 40,000 irregular 
98 
horsemen from Diyarbakir, Suleimaniyah, and Urmiya against the Russians. However, 
his loyalty appeared to be divided between the Ottomans and another local Kurdish 
overlord, Sheikh Jelaluddin. While 'Ubaydullah was the key religious figure, Jelaluddin 
maintained the bulk of political influence and military clout. While 'Ubaydullah and his 
militia carried out military operations under Ottoman orders in Bayazid in June 1877, 
some reports suggested that his militia acted as a rogue force under the influence of 
Sheikh Jelaluddin.9 9 Sheikh Jelaluddin, who came from Urmiya, also participated with 
9 6
 Ozoglu, "'Nationalism' and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman and Early 
Republican Era," InternationalJournal of Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 3 (August 
2001): 387-388. 
9 7
 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 77. 
9 8
 Geylani makes this claim in an interview with Erdost in the 1950s. Erdost, 160. 
9 9
 Norman describes 'Ubaydullah as operating "under the flag of Jelaluddin." Charles 
Boswell Norman, Armenia, and the Campaign of1877, (New York: Cassell, Petter & 
Galpin, 1878), 278. 
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the Ottomans in raising Kurdish cavalry regiments to fight the Russians. Jelaluddin's 
intent in participating along side the Ottomans appeared to be more insidious than that of 
'Ubaydullah. While 'Ubaydullah sought to acquire status within the Empire during the 
war, Jelaluddin sought to completely undermine the Ottoman and Qajar authority in the 
Kurdish-populated regions over which he had influence. The Persian foreign minister 
complained of Sheikh Jelaluddin's "habit of transferring his allegiance backwards and 
forwards from Turkey to Persia.. .extending his marauding expeditions to both." 1 0 0 
Unlike other Kurdish leaders, however, Jelaluddin appeared to be a sworn enemy of the 
Russians, believing that an alliance with them would lead to further occupation and 
subjugation. 
The attitude of the sheikhs during the war was not exactly benevolent towards the 
Armenians, especially as Sheikh Jelaluddin came from a fanatical sect of Islam that 
disdained Christians. His father, Sheikh Sabadullah, reportedly donned a face veil when 
traveling, for he considered it a sin merely to glance at Christians.1 0 1 The actions of 
Sheikh Jelaluddin suggest that he continued his father's bigotry towards Christians. 
Under the prodding of Jelaluddin, 'Ubaydullah engaged in a number of activities to 
promote the cause of Kurdish autonomy from the Ottomans and Qajars. Most 
notoriously the Kurdish militia force brutally massacred the inhabitants of a number of 
Armenian villages in Van on suspicion of collaborating with the hated Russians. The 
Sublime Porte appeared to recognize Jelaluddin as a greater security threat than 
'Ubaydullah, and after the Kurds' crushing defeat at Beyazid and their military 
1 0 0
 Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby, Therapia, July 10, 1877, in British Documents, ed. 
§imsir, 1: 81. 
1 0 1
 Sasuni, 90. 
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indiscretions against the Armenians, the vali of Van had Jelaluddin poisoned at the order 
of Sultan Abdulhamid II. On the other hand the Sultan only had 'Ubaydullah exiled 
temporarily to Mecca on the hajj. 
Other Kurdish groups' switched loyalties back and forth between the Russians 
and the Ottomans. The Hayderanli tribe in the Mus and northern Van regions was 
growing in power and influence during the mid-1870s. By 1876 its chief, Mehrdad Bey 
Khatun-ogullan, and his son, Yusuf Bey, coerced Ottoman officials to grant their family 
the appointment of kaimmakam over the Shura-gel district (east of Van), threatening to 
cause widespread chaos if the Ottomans did not comply. Controlling most of the 
economic activity in the east, he was able to accumulate a great deal of wealth with 
which he was able to bribe Ottoman officials, and even conducted raids into Russian 
territory well before war was declared. Yet in time Yusuf Bey proved to be a double-
dealer, striking a deal with the Russians to send provisions to their troops in exchange for 
a large sum of money: 1 0 4 
It is a well-known fact, and I have it from an officer high on the Commander-in-
Chiefs staff, that Youssouf Bey, son of the late Mehrdad Bey, and nephew of 
Kurd Ismail Pasha, has been bought over by the Russians, and since the 
commencement of the war has been supplying them with grain. This man is an 
inhabitant of the village of Digor, and only a few days before I left the camp a 
party of Russians proceeded to that place to pay Youssouf Bey a friendly visit, 
who, fearing that a knowledge of the enemy being so close to the rear of his camp 
might come to the ears of the Marshal, determined to take the bull by the horns, 
so, warning them of their danger, he galloped off to Mukhtar Pasha's camp, and 
told him that a body . . . 1 0 5 
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57 
to engage in battle with occupying Ottoman forces. In order to preempt the Kurds from 
gaining upper hand in Dersim, the 4 Turkish brigade stormed a number of villages in the 
Toshik mountains driving the rebels out into the mountainous wilderness. Upon hearing 
the news of the Turkish forces' siege, local Kurds and Armenians took up arms and 
together summoned the support of neighboring tribes, forcing the Turks to retreat to the 
i • 106 
plains. 
Despite the Ottomans' meager successes in the war, the Ottomans were bracing 
themselves for massive territorial loss and economic damage by the time the Russians 
accepted a truce on January 31,1878. Although the war did not directly affect most of 
eastern Anatolia, it destabilized the region as a whole, leaving its inhabitants to compete 
for power and resources. The misery that both Armenian and Kurdish peasants suffered 
at the hands of dominant marauding Kurdish tribes—who acted with near impunity— 
multiplied as a result of the looming Russian invasion and the lack of security. The 
Russo-Turkish War spawned internecine conflict between Kurdish tribes in most regions 
of eastern Anatolia, in the midst of which scores of Armenian peasants were victimized. 
Thousands of Kurdish and Armenian peasants were wounded, killed, and left homeless. 
The Aftermath of the War 
On March 3, 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, recognizing the 
independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania and the autonomy of Bulgaria. As 
for eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans were to cede Ajaria to the Russians in exchange for 
war reparations. Additionally, because it was feared that the Kurds and Circassians 
would take reprisals against the Armenians, Article 16 stipulated that Russian troops 
1 0 6
 Celil writes that many songs refer to this battle. Celil, Intifada, 36. 
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would remain in the areas that were ceded to the Ottomans until the Sublime Porte 
implemented feasible reforms to protect them. Significantly, the treaty acknowledged the 
concerns that the Armenian National Assembly had put forth during the 1870s against the 
oppressive rule of the Kurdish tribes over the Armenian peasants in eastern Anatolia and 
ensured increased security in the region. While the Armenian masses largely 
welcomed Russian intervention in Armenia to relieve them of the burdens of 
Ottoman/Kurdish rule, the majority of the Armenian educated elite opposed Russian 
intervention and promoted Armenian autonomy hoping for the arrangements similar to 
108 
those made for regions in the Balkans. 
Fearing that the Treaty of San Stefano would give the Russians too much power 
in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia, British and French negotiators pressured Russia to 
reconvene at Berlin to rearrange the provisions. A delegation led by Mkrtich Khrimian 
went to Berlin on behalf of the Armenian National Assembly and Patriarch Nerses in 
order to lobby for the creation an autonomous Armenia. In a letter to Lord Salisbury, 
Khrimian dwelt at length on the grievances of the Armenians at the hands of the Kurds, 
claiming that such a rough history of coexistence made it impossible for Christians and 
Muslims to live together. The only fair solution, he claimed, was the creation of an 
"autonomous Christian organization" much like Lebanon in order to ensure the protection 
Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano reads: "As the evacuation of Russian troops of 
the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might 
give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations 
between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further 
delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces 
inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians." 
i r\n 
According to Sonyel, the majority of educated Armenians were opposed to Russian 
occupation while the majority of uneducated masses were in favor of it. Sonyel, 43-53. 
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1 1 0
 Treaty of Berlin, Article 61. 
1 1 1
 Duke of Argyll, Our Responsibilities for Turkey (London: J. Murray, 1896), 74. 
and prosperity of the Armenians in eastern Anatolia. 1 0 9 
To the chagrin of the Armenian delegation to the Congress of Berlin, its advocacy 
of an autonomous Armenia was to no avail. British negotiators deemed that autonomous 
Armenia would give an advantage to Russia and hence placed Armenia in the hands of 
Sublime Porte in hopes that they could gain a greater supervisory role over the region. 
The Treaty of Berlin reversed the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano in relation to 
the Armenian question. According to Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin the Russians 
were to withdraw troops from all of eastern Anatolia, and the Sultan was to assume full 
control of the region and take responsibility for the implementation of reforms for the 
Armenians under the loose supervision of the European powers: "The Sublime Porte 
undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the ameliorations and reforms demanded 
by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their 
security against the Circassians and the Kurds." 1 1 0 For many Western politicians, the 
Treaty of Berlin was, in relation to control over eastern Anatolia, a success in keeping the 
Russians at bay in the region that was least accessible to Western Europe. However for 
other Western observers of the Armenian question, Article 61 was an impending disaster. 
The Duke of Argyll cynically summed up his point of view on the overall effect of the 
inversion of the articles: "What was everybody's business was nobody's business." 1 1 1 
Upon his return from Berlin, Khrimian openly expressed his dismay at the 
Congress of Berlin in an inflammatory speech entitle "The Paper Ladle." In the speech 
he highlighted the futility of his petitions and documents, his paper ladle, in dipping into 
      atolia. 109
 t     
      
       
     
       t         
t  r i  ti . r i  t  rti l   f t  r t  f rli  t  i  
r  t  it r  tr  fr  ll f t r  t li ,  t  lt   t   f ll 
c tr l f t e re i  a  ta e res si ilit  f r t e i le e tati  f ref r s f r t e 
r e ia s er t e l se s er isi  ft  r ea  ers: " e li e rte 
undertakes to carry out, ithout further delay, the a eliorations and refor s de anded 
 local require ents in the provinces inhabited  the r enians, and to guarantee their 
sec rit  a ai st t e ircassia s a  t e r s."llo r  st r  liti i s, t  
reaty f erlin as, in relation to control over eastern natolia, a success in keeping the 
ussians at bay in the region that as least accessible to estern urope. o ever for 
other estern observers of the r enian question, rticle 61 as an i pending disaster. 
The uke of rgyll cynically su ed up his point of vie  on the overall effect of the 
inversion of the articles: " hat as everybody's business as nobody's business." III 
       
   t r      
       
109 Ibid., 51. 
110   ,  . 
III    onsibil ties r y 
60 
Mgrditch Khrimian, "The Paper Ladle," cited in Haig Ajemian Hayotz Hairig, 
"Navakogh vushditz haireniatz hayotz, trans. Vazken Movsesian (Tavriz: Adurbadagani 
hayotz temagan dubaran, 1929), 511-3, http://annenianliouse.org/khrimyan-
havrik/loving-father.html (accessed April 2008). 
1 1 3
 See Michael R. Milgrim, "An Overlooked Problem in Turkish-Russian Relations: The 
1878 War Indemnity" in International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 4, (October 
1978): 519-537. Quote is on page 522. 
the international "heriseh" (an Armenian stew that he uses as a metaphor for territory 
from which "large and small nations and governments would draw their portion") against 
those with iron ladles, weapons and arms: "where guns talk and swords make noise, what 
significance do appeals and petitions have?" He further called upon the Armenians to 
take up arms and fight for their liberty: "when you return to the Fatherland, to your 
relatives and friends, take weapons, take weapons and again w e a p o n s . . U s e your brain 
112 
and your fist! Man must work for himself in order to be saved." This speech 
significantly influenced the rise of militant separatist Armenian nationalism. Most 
notably Khrimian did not attach blame primarily to the Kurds and Circassians who were 
directly perpetrating atrocities against the Armenians; rather, he pointed his finger at the 
higher powers for neglecting their responsibilities in providing security for their citizens. 
The Ottoman Empire was in a state of dire economic need as a result of the war. 
Aside from amassing a huge public debt to European creditors, it came under the further 
burden of war indemnities owed to Russia. These indemnities, which were settled in the 
1880s, gave Russia an economic foothold in the Empire, where it had none before the 
1877-8 war. For the Ottoman Empire the indemnities "increased Ottoman indebtedness 
113 
by one-sixth" and placed the Empire's already unstable credit in further jeopardy. Tax 
collection became an even greater necessity in eastern Anatolia, although this yielded 
little success in the more remote regions. In 1881, Hussein Bey, one of the sons of Bedr 
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notably Khrimian did not attach blame primarily to the Kurds and Circassians who were 
directly perpetrating atrocities against the Armenians; rather, he pointed his finger at the 
higher powers for neglecting their responsibilities in providing security for their citizens. 
The Ottoman Empire was in a state of dire economic need as a result of the war. 
Aside from amassing a huge public debt to European creditors, it came under the further 
burden of war indemnities owed to Russia. These indemnities, which were settled in the 
1880s, gave Russia an economic foothold in the Empire, where it had none before the 
1877-8 war. For the Ottoman Empire the indemnities "increased Ottoman indebtedness 
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Khan, stirred up the Kurds in the Dersim region to rebel against the Ottoman government, 
claiming that the Ottomans were destroying Kurdish villages that did not pay taxes. 
Hussein Bey managed to convince the shaykh of an impending Ottoman invasion. He 
gathered a force of 500 armed Kurdish soldiers to hide in the mountains and seal off all 
mountain passes. While the Ottoman army was able to drive back the Kurdish rebels, the 
operation elicited a strong response from the Russian consul: "Sending the army to 
collect taxes during such a time for the purpose of collecting taxes is a dangerous 
undertaking."1 1 4 
The Rise of Sultan Abdulhamid II: Perceptions of Him in History 
Although Sultan Abdulhamid II came to power in 1876, the influence of his 
policies was not widely felt until after the Russo-Turkish War. Sultan Abdulhamid II 
came onto the political scene during a time when the Ottoman government was divided 
over the proper direction in which to steer its policy. On the one hand liberal Western-
influenced politicians sought to bring a Western-model constitutional system to the 
Empire which would ultimately limit the power of the sultanate and vest power in a 
representative parliament. On the other hand, conservative politicians promoted a strong 
sultanate and sought to move away from Westernizing the political system. Abdulhamid 
II was part the latter camp, those who promoted the restructuring of the Ottoman political 
system to reflect what it had been before the introduction of the Westernizing tanzimat 
reforms.1 1 5 With the promulgation of the constitution failing to deter the greater powers 
1 1 4
 January 25, 1880 telegram sent to the commander of the fourth division of the army 
Fadli Pasha by the Russian Consul in Van, cited in Celil, Intifada, 105. 
1 1 5
 For further details on the divide in the Ottoman government see Butrus Abu-Manneh, 
"The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud 
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from intervening in the Ottoman Empire, the Russo-Turkish War provided the impetus 
for the Sultan to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution on February 14, 1878, 
only two weeks after the Russians accepted a truce. This commenced a new era of 
Ottoman government in which power was vested completely in the sultanate and in 
which what was claimed to be traditional Islamic norms became the medium of 
governance. 
Following the war, Sultan Abdulhamid II was obliged to acknowledge the 
Balkans as "limbs.. .that could be amputated without fatal effect;" central and eastern 
116 
Anatolia, on the other hand were "the body of the Ottoman state." Either by fate, or 
Machiavellian scheming, Abdulhamid managed, during his thirty-three years in power, to 
end up winning a long and drawn-out contest for eastern Anatolia against the tenacious 
arms of the British, the Russians, and the Armenian nationalists, although he achieved 
much notoriety on a global level in the struggle to realize such victory over the region. 
His critics blamed him for creating division between the Kurds and Armenians and 
massacring tens of thousands of Armenians, frequently referring to him as the "Red 
Sultan," "the butcher," and "Armenophobe." "He it is who is responsible," wrote James 
Wilson Pierce in 1896, "not the Kurds and Turks, who have only been the instruments of 
his cruelty."1 1 7 Most remarkable, however, is that after the conflict in the mid-1890s the 
legacy of Sultan Abdulhamid II in eastern Anatolia appeared to cast a shadow over the 
factors that had led to the rise of the Armenian question before the Russo-Turkish War. 
Nedim Pasa," International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 3 (August 1990): 257-
274. 
1 1 6
 Mesrob K. Krikorian, Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire 1860-1908 
(London: Routledge and Keagan Paul Ltd., 1977), 7. 
      
  t    
 r     
 t     
     
  ii i    
 .   t;  
Anatolia, on the other hand were "the body of the Ottoman state.,,116 Either by fate, or 
Machiavellian scheming, Abdiilhamid managed, during his thirty-three years in power, to 
end up winning a long and drawn-out contest for eastern Anatolia against the tenacious 
arms of the British, the Russians, and the Armenian nationalists, although he achieved 
much notoriety on a global level in the struggle to realize such victory over the region. 
His critics blamed him for creating division between the Kurds and Armenians and 
massacring tens of thousands of Armenians, frequently referring to him as the "Red 
Sultan," "the butcher," and "Armenophobe." "He it is who is responsible," wrote James 
Wilson Pierce in 1896, "not the Kurds and Turks, who have only been the instruments of 
his cruelty."lI7 Most remarkable, however, is that after the conflict in the mid-1890s the 
legacy of Sultan Abdiilhamid II in eastern Anatolia appeared to cast a shadow over the 
factors that had led to the rise of the Armenian question before the Russo-Turkish War. 
 t rnational rnal a/ le st ies  
116 enians ice a/t  t an ire 1860-
 ),
63 
The notion that Armenian and Kurdish society suddenly became divided and polarized 
upon his rise to power began to take hold after the conflict in the 1890s. General 
Mayewski, Russian Consul General to the Ottoman Empire in Bitlis and Van, wrote: 
"Before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, no enmity was witnessed 
118 
between [Kurds and Armenians] and they generally got by like brothers." 
Abdurrahman Bedr Khan, who came out against the sultan and sided with his opponents 
the Young Turks, wrote in the journal Kurdistan in 1900: 
Before [Abdulhamid II] ascended the throne, the Kurds were knowledgeable and 
civilized people, having brotherly relations with Armenians and avoiding any 
kind of confrontations. Then what happened? Did [Kurdish] civilization and 
knowledge turn into barbarity, ignorance, and organized rebellion? Who else 
carries out the atrocities in Kurdistan but the members of the Hamidiye divisions, 
who are armed by the sultan and proud of being loyal to h im? 1 1 9 
Given the level of hostility voiced towards the sultan later in his reign, it is 
remarkable that immediately following the Russo-Turkish War, British officials regarded 
him as compliant. According to Sir Henry Layard, who was in charge of implementing 
the reforms for the Armenians in 1878, the sultan appeared to be "a liberal and 
enlightened monarch." 1 2 0 It is further remarkable that Abdulhamid's "personal finances 
were handled by a well-known Armenian Galata banker, Hagop Zarifi Bey, from whom 
he gained a knowledge of finance and economics that was to serve him well in later 
1 1 7
 James Wilson Pierce, Story of Turkey and Armenia (R.H. Woodward Company, 
1896), 91. 
118 
General Mayewski, Rus General MayewskiUnin Dogu Anadolu Raporu: Van ve Bitlis 
Vilayetleri Askeri Istatistiki (Van: Van Belediye Baskanhgi, Kultiir ve Sosyal Isjer 
Mudurlugii, 1997), 171. 
1 1 9
 Abdurrahman Bedr Khan, "Kiirdler ve Ermeniler" [Kurds and Armenians], Kurdistan 
26, (Dec. 14, 1900), cited in Klein, "Power in the Periphery: The Hamidiye Light Cavalry 
and the Struggle over Ottoman Kurdistan, 1890-1914" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 
2002), 96. 
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times." No matter what the sultan's initial intentions may have been in relation to the 
Armenians in eastern Anatolia, his loss of the war made him appear even more 
powerless. Kurdish and Armenian leaders were predominantly preoccupied with the 
political actions of Russia and Britain and rarely expressed unease or concern at the fact 
that the sultan had seized complete power in 1878 by dissolving the parliament and 
suspending the constitution. 
Effects of the War on Armenian and Kurdish Loyalties 
The war had a paradoxical effect on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire 
and the inhabitants of eastern Anatolia. On the one hand, the war prompted the Ottomans 
to penetrate deeply into regions of eastern Anatolia that had hitherto been relatively 
autonomous in order to gather resources, taxes, and military recruits; on the other, the 
Ottomans' removal of troops from many regions of eastern Anatolia to fight in other parts 
of the Empire decreased overall security and created a political vacuum in the region of 
which many Kurdish and Armenian leaders, who had been anticipating windows of 
opportunity to mobilize power and take greater control, took advantage. 
In October 1877 it was reported that many nomadic tribes inhabiting the Sasun 
mountains had descended upon villages in Diyarbakir and Mush provinces engaging in 
blood feuds with rival tribes in an attempt to regain power and land lost to them decades 
earlier. Kurds and Armenians perished their campaigns. One reporter writes: "While I 
was in the Pashalic of Diarbakir, no less than three Mahommedan chiefs were murdered 
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by these robbers for the sake of their property." Pent up tensions between tribes were 
high and conflict was reported to have arisen over such paltry matters as the possession 
of a gun. The local authorities in Van and Diyarbakir were too often too weak to stave 
off the onslaught of nomadic Kurdish tribes, arrest them, or prosecute them for criminal 
acts. The Ottoman military was off fighting in the northeast and the armed forces 
available to them often consisted of Kurds whose loyalty was questionable. 
Armenians in the Zeitoun region, who had been fiercely independent since the 
Crimean War, staged a rebellion against the Ottomans. In 1877 an influential Armenian 
leader in Zeitoun by the name of Babek rallied a number of Armenians together to revolt 
against the Ottomans on the grounds of their continual and burdensome demands for 
money and animals from the Armenians to support the war effort. For months Babek and 
his men wreaked havoc upon surrounding Turkish villages, looting, plundering, and 
murdering. The unrest prompted the Ottomans to intervene physically in Zeitoun in 
September 1878. After a visit to the area, Lieutenant Chermside reported that "the 
123 
condition of the town and people of Zeitoun is a disgrace to any Government." 
Although the declared aim of the Ottomans was to restore order in Zeitoun, the 
move provoked a number of Armenians, hitherto not involved in the Babek revolt, to take 
action. In November, an Armenian cleric by the name of Deli Papaz (Crazy Priest), who 
considered the Ottoman presence in Zeitoun an occupation, traveled from Istanbul to 
Zeitoun and incited the Armenians to rebel yet again. 1 2 4 Conflicts between Armenians, 
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Kurds, and Turks escalated to a wider area throughout the Zeitoun region. By February 
1879 numerous clashes between armed Muslim groups and Armenians broke out, 
prompting British officials to demand the Ottomans to launch an inquiry into the matter 
and expedite reforms affecting the Armenians. A renewed effort by the Ottomans to 
intervene in Zeitoun proved to be a failure and prompted increased clashes between 
Armenians and Muslims. It was only when the British intervened diplomatically, 
offering Babek protection from Muslim reprisal in exchange for a truce with the 
125 
Ottomans, that the debacle in Zeitoun was eventually settled in November 1879. 
The Babek revolt was a loss for the Ottomans. They failed to oust the Armenian 
rebels from the mountains, Babek gained an amnesty, and they were coerced by the 
British to provide protection for the rebels in their mountain refuge. Babek gained 
widespread popularity among the Zeitouni Armenians as a result of the revolt, and was 
eventually named the president of the municipality of Zeitoun. The arrangements 
particularly angered the Muslim administration in the vilayet of Maras whom the British 
suspected of trying to plot revenge against him. These suspicions were confirmed in July 
1884 when the kaimmakam of Maras attempted to arrest Babek on charges of tax evasion, 
but managed to escape to the mountains with some two hundred to three hundred 
followers. The kaimmakam organized a force to pursue the fugitives and provoked a 
group of armed Armenian resistors to fire on them. The event alarmed both the British 
and the Porte who admonished the vali of Aleppo and the kaimmakam of Maras not to 
take rash action and to refrain from stoking the fires of yet another rebellion. 
Interestingly the turf battle planted the seeds of discord between the Armenians 
1 2 5
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themselves more than between the Ottomans, who were diplomatically bound by the 
British at the time, and the Armenians. Gregorian Orthodox Armenians, fearing reprisals 
would be aimed at them, placed the blame on the Armenian Catholic Bishop of Maras 
and his flock for provoking the incident.1 2 6 
Many Armenians, mostly the educated urban elite, did not regard the Kurds alone 
as the greatest threat to the Armenian peasantry. Rather, many Armenians saw a greater 
threat in the power struggle between Kurdish tribes for control of the land. The following 
report from Major Trotter shows that in many parts of eastern Anatolia, Kurds and 
Armenians were not pitted against each other based on ethnic distinctions; rather, 
Armenians were merely caught in the middle of the rampages of outsider Kurds—mostly 
tribal-nomads—attempting to collect dues, assert authority over rival tribes, or repel 
Ottoman control: 
127 
I stopped a few minutes at the village [Madrak, in the Chabakchur district] and 
was at once surrounded by a crowd of Armenians, who, while loudly complaining 
of the misdeeds of the Kurds from the neighbouring country, professed to be on 
good terms with, and well treated by, the Kurds of their own village; and in truth 
the Kurdish priest or imam was standing by, and joining in all the assertions of the 
Armenian priest, who was the principal spokesman. There is no doubt that not 
only do both Christians and Kurds suffer terribly from bands of roving insurgent 
Kurds from the neighbouring mountains, but in many villages the Armenians also 
suffer terrible oppression at the hands of their own [Kurdish] beys and aghas, the 
old feudal lords of the soil. As far as I can make out, these beys, however 
oppressive themselves, are willing to protect their own subjects, as far as lies in 
their power, from external violence, but in the present disorganised state of the 
country they can defend neither their Christian serfs not their own 
i n o 
coreligionists. 
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In some instances it appeared that the war brought Kurds and Armenians closer 
together. Colonel Wilson reported that many Shi'i Kurds complained of Turkish 
officials' ill treatment towards them and even considered conversion to Christianity in 
order to avoid military service. Other Kurdish tribes of Armenian origin, he wrote, 
expressed the desire to convert to Christianity in the hope of being able to take part in the 
governance of an autonomous Armenia. He further believed there to be possibilities of 
an alliance between Kurds and Armenians: "It seemed to me preposterous that there 
should be any harmony between two races apparently so antagonistic, but it appears that 
negotiations, under the pretext of trade, are at this moment being carried on with the 
129 
Dersim Kurds, and also with a powerful Chief in the neighborhood of Mush." Shaykh 
'Ubaydullah, it was believed, was also considering joining such an alliance on the 
130 
condition that he would play a leading role. 
Kurds throughout eastern Anatolia, particularly in the southeast, were fearful that 
Ottoman actions were indeed carving out a geographic space for an autonomous 
Armenia. Shaykh 'Ubaydullah apparently said the following to an Ottoman official in 
reaction to the ongoing political developments in eastern Anatolia: 
What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in 
Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare 
themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the 
Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson on Anatolia and necessary Reforms, 
June 22, 1880, FO 424/107, pp. 2-4, no. 2, in British Documents, ed. §imsir, 2: 70. 
1 3 0
 §imsir, British Documents, 2: 172. In January 1881 Colonel Wilson later dismissed 
his belief that a Kurdish-Armenian alliance would form: "A rumour of a rapprochement 
between Kurds and Armenians is not one to which I would attach much importance. In 
many districts, however, common animosity to the Turk, and Chrisitan traditions, have 
maintained kindly feelings between the Armenians and Kizil-Bash Kurds (not in 
Kurdistan)." 
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women." 1 3 1 
In 1878, anticipating that major administrative reforms would be imposed that would 
alter the Kurds' role in local politics, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah established an organization 
known as the Kurdish League, joining together a number of prominent Kurdish tribal 
chiefs and beys. One of the sons of Bedr Khan, Bahri Bey, acted as an emissary for the 
Kurdish League, gaining the support of Kurdish tribal leaders in the surrounding areas, 
particularly Cizre, where he and his family had the most influence.1 3 2 
Many British officials initially feared that Shaykh 'Ubaydullah would maintain 
his alliance with the Ottomans and initiate a military campaign against the Armenians in 
Van and Hakkari to prevent them from seizing control. British Ambassador Layard 
suspected that Samih Pasa, the Fourth Army commander, was bribing 'Ubaydullah and 
other Kurdish chiefs—whose prior actions against the Christians, according to the report, 
'merite la corde [warrant the noose]'—with gifts and money in order to maintain their 
loyalty.1 3 3 Abbott, the British consul in Tabriz, believed the sheikh to be "carrying out 
the wishes of the retrograde party in Turkey" and advised the British government to keep 
him under surveillance.1 3 4 The Armenians also feared an alliance between the Kurds and 
the Ottomans. In a letter to the Armenian patriarch, Khrimian stated his suspicion that 
the formation of the League was an Ottoman ploy to undermine Armenian political aims: 
"A Kurdish League is about to be formed at the instigation of the Central Government, 
1 3 1
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which desired to stifle the Armenian question by raising a new one, that of the Kurds." 
In the letter Khrimian further claims that the League was "the Ottoman policy, the 
Shaykh Ebedullah its nominal center; Bahri Bey its assiduous emissary." 
Despite suspicions that the Kurds were operating under secret Ottoman command, 
there is no evidence for this. On the contrary, there was a palpable fear among Porte 
officials that the Muslim and Christian populations would unite and stage a massive 
rebellion. In the fall of 1878, the sons of Bedr Khan, Hussein Bey and Osman Bey, led a 
number of Kurdish tribes to take their homeland Cizre, located between Mosul and 
Diyarbakir. Local Ottoman officials, doubting the power of their own armies to prevail 
against the Kurdish tribal forces, fled in terror, and the Kurdish forces entered Cizre 
unchallenged. This movement towards what appeared to be the establishment of an 
'independent' (most likely autonomous) Kurdish state was not, however, long tolerated 
by the Porte. Sending in some seventeen military regiments from Diyarbakir, Erzincan, 
and Erzurum, the Porte sought to curtail the spread of the campaign of the sons of Bedr 
Khan and eliminate all resistance. Although the Kurdish tribal force was able to fend off 
the Ottoman forces for a while, it could not withstand a major influx of Ottoman 
136 
regiments in the region and eventually surrendered. 
A number of other factors drove the Kurds to join the banner of 'Ubaydullah. 
Increases in property taxes (emlak vergisi) and sheep taxes (agnam vergisi), imposed by 
the Ottomans to offset the economic crisis of the 1870s severely affected the majority of 
the rural, predominantly pastoral-nomadic Kurdish population. The appointment of state-
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employed tax-collectors further upset those Kurds who had enjoyed either tax exemption 
or tax collection privileges. Increased taxation of agriculture, compounded with rising 
inflation and the devaluation of the currency, forced up prices of grains and bread 
throughout the semiurban areas of eastern Anatolia, and the administrations of Erzurum, 
137 
Diyarbakir, and Mosul reported massive food shortages and rioting in 1879 and 1880. 
According to a petition by the Armenian Patriarch dated May, 1890, widespread famine 
was behind the raids of the Kurds against the Armenians. 1 3 8 
'Ubaydullah's exact political aims following the Russo-Turkish War are unclear, 
and some of his letters suggest that he was pursuing a Kurdish nationalist agenda. He 
wrote to Vice-Consul Clayton: "The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is 
different, and their laws and customs are distinct.... We want our affairs to be in our 
139 
hands.... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands." 
However, given his constant shifting of loyalties, and his habit of forming alliances with 
whatever power would give him a high-ranking position, his appeal to an independent 
Kurdish state appears to be nothing more than rhetoric influenced by contemporary 
nationalist trends among the various Christian groups in the Ottoman Empire. In a letter 
to the Mar Shimun, the leader of the Nestorian Christians, 'Ubaydullah clarified his 
opposition to the Ottoman presence in eastern Anatolia but suggests paying a degree of 
tribute to the Ottomans in order to gain the status of "independent princes in their 
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respective countries."1 4 0 The suggestion that tribute be paid to gain Ottoman recognition 
of autonomy bore some semblance to the political strategies that had been employed by 
Bedr Khan in the 1840s: making bids to a number of actors for the purpose of gaining 
increased political power. 
'Ubaydullah's attempt to rally support from local Christian groups can be 
interpreted as a move towards attracting Western European sympathy for the Kurdish 
cause, and as a way of offsetting the establishment of an Armenian state. The Mar 
Shimun rejected 'Ubaydullah's bid for a union between the Nestorians and his Kurdish 
followers, stating his distrust for the sheikh based on his earlier indiscretions against 
Nestorians and other Christians. 'Ubaydullah also called for the cooperation of local 
Armenians, who, like the Nestorians, were wary of his true objectives.1 4 1 
Between 1880 and 1882 'Ubaydullah embarked on a lengthy and complex bid for 
power. In 1880 he launched an invasion of Persia with Ottoman backing; a year later he 
incited the Kurds to rise up against the Ottomans. Ultimately he was deemed an 
untrustworthy character in eastern Anatolia and was forced to surrender after an attempt 
to take the town of Amadia with his son Abdulkadir. He was exiled to Medina where he 
died in 1883. 
One of the major obstacles facing the Porte in implementing security in eastern 
Anatolia was not the strength of the rebellion throughout the countryside, but the greed 
and venality of its own officials. Rebellion was so widespread that Ottoman forces were 
unable to implement overall security readily and effectively. Furthermore many Ottoman 
1 4 0
 Captain Clayton to Major Trotter, Van, November 14, 1879, in British Documents, ed. 
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officials were corrupt and turned a blind eye to the genuine grievances of Kurdish tribal 
lords in exchange for bribes. In 1881 the Earl of Dufferin, then British ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire, submitted a report detailing the actions of the some of the valis. Izzet 
Pasa, the vali of Diyarbakir, failed to quell crime, often accepting bribes from rabble-
rousers in exchange for their acquittal. He miscalculated the need for grain to offset the 
severe famine in Diyarbakir as a result of the widespread rebellion during the war. 
Consequently riots broke out in the city in 1879 and 1880. Due to the failure of the vali 
to supply Malatya, northwest of Diyarbakir, with sufficient necessities and security, the 
Kurdish tribes, reported Dufferin, were "in a chronic state of rebellion." While no counts 
of corruption were attributed to the mutesarrif of Maras, Munif Pasa (who oversaw 
Zeitoun), he was reported to be weak and incapable of implementing any effective 
security measures. The vali of Erzurum forced the inhabitants to pay for the grain that 
the Ottoman government had sent as a gift to offset the famine. As a result of his 
corruption, it is reported that forty-five Kurds died of starvation.1 4 2 
The Russo-Turkish War disrupted the balance of power between Ottomans and Kurds 
that had only been held tenuously in place by the relatively weak Ottoman security 
forces. Ottoman losses in the war encouraged elements of Armenian and Kurdish society 
to make bids for power. However, as most of these resistance efforts lacked 
organization, training, and equipment, they were generally no match for the Ottoman 
military. As such a greater number of groups, including several formerly fragmented 
Kurdish tribes and particular groups of Armenians and Nestorians, began entertaining the 
4
 Captain Clayton to Major Trotter, Van, November 9, 1880 in British Documents, ed. 
$imsir, 2: 151. 
1 2
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notion of an alliance; however, their overall lack of organization and cohesion prevented 
such an idea from ever materializing. The activities of Shaykh 'Ubaydullah in Hakkari 
and that of the Armenians in Zeitoun were the most prominent movements. But their 
greatest effect was that they heightened the concern of the Ottomans and prompted them 
to install tighter security. As the Ottomans began to increase security throughout eastern 
Anatolia, the traditional power structures in Kurdish society became increasingly broken 
down and at the same time, more and more Armenians began to lose faith in the 
Ottoman-backed Patriarchate. 
    
    l  
      
 t       
    




THE EARLY SULTAN ABDULHAMID PERIOD 1882-1896: 
THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS OF CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE KURDS AND ARMENIANS 
By the beginning of the 1890s the majority of Kurdish and Armenian peasants 
were still not integrated into the Ottoman system. While Sultan Abdulhamid II was 
beginning to win the allegiance of the major tribes, they still had free rein over much of 
the territory; albeit to a more limited degree. Support for the Armenian revolutionary 
movement had begun to spread among the Armenians in the cities most of whom were 
tied in with either the esnaf (merchant class) or the clergy. However, since the Porte 
exerted significant pressure to contain Armenians and bolster the Patriarchate against the 
dissidents, the revolutionary movement failed to blossom significantly inside the Empire. 
On the other hand, the movement witnessed dramatic growth outside the Empire in the 
early 1890s and began to infiltrate eastern Anatolia, where it gained considerable 
popularity among the peasantry. This chapter explores the series of events that led up to 
the conflict between the Kurds and the Armenians in the mid-1890s and seeks to 
understand the rise of this conflict in the context of the strengths or weaknesses of the 
power structures within Kurdish and Armenian society. 
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Armenian Revolutionaries and the Kurds 
Armenian-Kurdish relations during the 1880s and 1890s cannot be understood 
without reference to the role of the Armenian revolutionaries. The activities of the two 
leading Armenian political parties, the Dashnak party and the Hunchak party, had a 
tremendous impact upon the social and political atmosphere of eastern Anatolia in the 
1890s. Their activism towards the liberation of the Armenians in eastern Anatolia, which 
they referred to as Western Armenia, greatly influenced the attitudes of the Armenians 
towards the Kurds. 
One factor that set the Armenians apart from the Kurds was that they were much 
more politically organized both inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, largely because 
of the millet system, which had long set the Armenians apart both from the Muslims and 
from other Christian groups. It gave the Armenians a greater sense of ethnic identity at 
all social levels in the sense that Armenian peasant in eastern Anatolia and a high-ranking 
Armenian government official both identified themselves as Armenian. While these were 
almost certainly high-ranking officials of Kurdish origin, none of them identified 
themselves as such, since they tended to assimilate to Turkish culture and adopt a Turkish 
ethnic identity. It was much easier for Armenian political leaders to mobilize a force of 
Armenians by appealing to the ethnic identity than for their Kurdish counterparts. 
The impetus for the Armenian revolutionary movement derived from grassroots 
Armenian political activity in the 1860s. The Armenian rebellions of 1862 in Zeitoun, 
Van, and Erzurum came at a significant time during the history of the Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire, when the power of the clergy and the Armenian amira class was 
begimiing to wane. An emerging Armenian bourgeoisie, which was involved in trade 
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Millingen, Wild Life, 264. 
and commerce, was beginning to enjoy greater powers under the Armenian constitution 
and in addition the Catholic and Protestant Armenians were no longer subject to the 
authority of the Gregorian Patriarch. The Ottoman government's confiscation of 
Armenian property, out of fear of growing Armenian accumulation of power after the 
Crimean War in the late 1850s incited the Armenians in Van, Mus, and Zeitoun (all 
regions that were dominated more by merchant classes than by the clergy and the amira 
class) to revolt. 
The Zeitoun revolt was the most significant of these rebellions in that, although 
the Armenians were unable to defeat the Ottoman forces militarily, they managed to 
outwit them and achieve a political victory. By achieving the intervention of the French 
under Napolean III and with the help of influential Armenian amiras, the Zeitounis 
gained enough leverage to force the Porte to withdraw its troops and concede autonomy 
to them. 1 4 3 The rebellions at Van and Mus were less successful and resulted in heavy 
casualties on the Armenian side. Remarkably the Armenians involved in the uprising at 
Van managed to persuade a number of Kurdish tribes to join with them in their attacks on 
Ottoman forces. Millingen, however, reports than such collaboration was exceptional. 
According to Millingen, the Armenians throughout most of the Van province were 'serfs' 
under the feudal rule of the Kurds. 1 4 4 In Mus the Kurds did not collaborate with the 
Armenians, but fought against them. 1 4 5 
The rebellions instilled a sense of Armenian solidarity among many segments of 
the Armenian population, particularly those outside the avenues of power within the 
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clergy. The first Armenian revolutionary society, the Union of Salvation, was established 
in Van in 1872. As Van was one of the only cities in the Ottoman Empire with an 
Armenian majority, it was not surprising that it was one of the main centers of the 
revolutionary movement. Not much is known of the Union of Salvation, but a few 
documents reveal that it its aim was to establish greater ties with the Russians and to 
ensure the protection of the Van Armenians against the Kurds and Ottoman oppression 
by acquiring arms. Although the organization did not last many years, partly because of 
its underground nature and the consequent failure to attract large numbers of supporters, 
it provided the foundation for the development of the first Armenian political party, the 
146 
Armenakan Party, established in Van in 1885. 
After the Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin, Armenian revolutionaries 
were generally in accord on the following issues: an autonomous or independent 
Armenia, increased protection for Armenians both against organized military operations 
and brigandage (generally from nomadic Kurdish tribes), the creation of societies that 
would include all Armenians, and the acquisition of weapons for self-defense. However, 
there was significant disagreement both inside and outside the Empire regarding the 
direction which Armenian political activism should take. Liberal Armenians were the 
main proponents of Armenian political activity. Most conservatives were tied closely to 
the clergy and as such feared voicing strong opposition to the Porte. In a letter to 
Granville, Wyndham reported that the Patriarch Nerses, even after his resignation in 
1881, still pledged his loyalty to the Sultan in his dealings with the Armenians. The 
Patriarch said that he was "anxious not to see the Armenians of Turkey fall under the 
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despotic rule of Russia.. .[and] that he wished them to continue under that of the Sultan, 
but in an improved condition."1 4 7 
The debate between Armenian revolutionary conservatives and liberals was 
particularly highlighted in the Armenian newspapers Mshak (cultivator) and Meghu 
Hayastani (the Armenian Bee) in Tiflis. While the Armenian activists hovering around 
Mshak were more liberal and favored a political trajectory of Westernization for the 
Armenian society, the Meghu Hayastani was more conservative and favored traditional 
Armenian norms over more progressive ideas in establishing a foundation for political 
activity.1 4 8 The division between the two was further represented in their stances on 
Armenian relations with the Kurds. The Meghu Hayastani promoted Armenian 
exclusivity in political activity and, although it advocated friendship with the non-violent 
Kurds, it frowned upon joining political agendas with them. According to one writer in 
the Meghu Hayastani the Kurds' religion was one of the main reasons for their tendency 
towards violence. 1 4 9 In contrast Mshak was much more in favor of a Kurdish-Armenian 
alliance against the Ottomans. In the late 1870s it revealed that a number of Armenian 
gunsmiths were already involved in Kurdish political activity in Iran, hiring themselves 
out to Kurdish militiamen fighting against the Ottoman and Iranian governments.1 5 0 "If 
the Bulgarians rose up against the Turks and killed them," asserted one writer, "then the 
Armenians should undertake more dangerous activities, attempting to Armenize the 
1 4 7
 Wyndham to Granville, Constantinople, December 31, 1882, no. 1160, FO 424/140, p. 
1, no. 1, in British Documents, ed. §imsir, 2: 446-447. 
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Vahe Oshagan, "Modem Armenian Literature and Intellectual History from 1700 to 
1915," in The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, vol. 2, ed. Richard 
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80 
Kurds and instill them with our culture."1 5 1 After the Russo-Turkish War, the 
Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians finally had a single and shared interest to fight against 
the Ottomans: "they all share the burden that Turkey has placed upon their shoulders." 
The Black Cross Society was established in 1878 in Van, most likely in response 
to the devastation which the Russo-Turkish War wrought upon the vilayet of Van. The 
society functioned much like a cult and was even more secretive than the Union of 
Salvation. Its members were to take an oath of secrecy and those who broke this were 
cursed with the mark of the 'black cross' and killed. Much like the Union of Salvation 
this society aimed to acquire arms and form a militia for the protection of their 
153 
compatriots. The society failed because of its lack of funding and limited support. 
In 1882 another secret revolutionary organization, the Protectors of the 
Fatherland, was formed in Erzurum. It was far more successful than the Black Cross 
Society and the Union of Salvation because of is appeal to Armenians from all social 
strata. Members of the organization were skeptical of the Porte's expressed the intention 
of implementing the reforms promised under the Treaty of Berlin and aimed to take 
measures to protect the Armenians from the Turks, Kurds, and Circassians. The 
organization aroused the suspicion of the Porte when large numbers of its members were 
found crossing the borders into Russia to solicit the financial and military support of 
Russian Armenians. Subsequently, the Porte placed seventy-six Armenians on trial on 
charges of conspiracy, forty of whom were found guilty. The trial, the first of its kind 
1 5 0
 Houri Berberian, Armenians and the Constitutional Revolution 1905-1911 (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 59. 
1 5 1
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1 5 2
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Ibid., 85-89. 
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against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, left an indelible impact on Armenians within 
the Ottoman Empire and abroad, who claimed injustice and oppression. Nalbandian 
notes that the occurrences at Erzurum during 1882 and 1883 inspired a common 
revolutionary song "The Voice Reechoed from the Armenian Mountains of Erzerum."1 5 4 
It is significant that Armenian revolutionaries did not promote the idea that the 
Kurds were categorically marauders and anti-Armenian. Rather, after the Treaty of 
Berlin, there was a general sense among the Armenian revolutionaries that the Kurds 
could in some ways be useful to their cause. News of a Kurdish-Armenian alliance 
spread throughout many avenues of communication. The newspaper Osmanli published 
an article on the possibility of a such an alliance. The Armenians, it claimed, were luring 
Kurds to their side by "preaching Christianity to them" and offering them education.1 5 5 
In reality it appears that conservative Armenian revolutionaries favored developing 
political movements that included Armenians only, while more liberal Armenians 
entertained the idea of including the Kurds in their movements. 
Complaints of Kurdish Attacks 
Although the Ottomans did manage to control much of eastern Anatolia, certain 
regions were still unsecured. During the early 1880s Ottoman control over the sancak of 
Mus was weak. The remoteness of the region from any lucrative trade routes provided 
little incentive for the Ottoman Porte to provide security, and as it was also distant from 
any Russian or British consulate, Armenians who had complaints about the situation had 
to travel long distances in order to file a report. The Porte's constant rearrangement of 
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the borders of the eastern vilayets left many areas of eastern Anatolia unaccounted for 
and there was generally little order. While the cities of Van, Diyarbakir, and Erzurum 
were the main centers of Ottomans political and military authority, Mus was an 
inconvenience for the Porte. While it was originally a part of the vilayet of Van, it was 
placed in the Bitlis vilayet in 1880. 1 5 6 
It seems that the Ottomans entrusted Musa Bey, an eminent Kurdish chief in Mus, 
with the responsibility of providing the security for the region. He had acquired a leading 
position in the vilayet of Bitlis for some time in the early 1880s, most likely because of 
his clout among the Kurdish tribes of the region. As such he had tremendous influence 
on the vali of Bitlis and appeared to have nearly free reign throughout the Mus region. 
During the 1880s Musa Bey gained widespread notoriety among Armenians and British. 
He became infamous as the Kurdish chief that attacked and robbed Dr. Reynolds, an 
American physician, and M. Knapp, a missionary, who were traveling between Mus and 
Bitlis in 18 8 3 . 1 5 7 According to the missionaries the sultan did not punish Musa Bey 
sufficiently and did not give indemnities to either of the two victims until nineteen years 
1 CO 
after the incident. 
According to a letter from a missionary in Van 1886, Musa Bey appeared to be at 
large in the region creating havoc with his tribal followers who "roamed freely" and were 
1 5 6
 Vahakn Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 141. 
1 5 7
 Protestant missionaries Grace Knapp and Clarence Douglas Ussher note that they 
passed by the village of Musa Bey who "[inflicted] several sword wounds on Dr. 
Raynolds's head, face and hands [and] left [him] bound in the woods, some distance from 
the road." Grace Knapp and Clarence Douglas Ussher, An American Physician in 
Turkey: A Narrative of Adventures in Peace and War (London: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1917), 32. 
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Ibid., 78. Dr. Reynolds reportedly used this money to construct a church which he 
referred to as the church "built by the Kurds." 
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282. "Vartenis village prevented a Kurdish chieftain by the name of Musa Bey from 
passing the night in that village, but in the village of Khars a despicable character known 
as Hovsep considered it an honor to accept Musa Bey in his home." 
"heavily armed," which was contrary to the law. 1 5 9 Other documents report that Musa 
Bey led his tribe, which was seminomadic, from village to village in order to collect dues 
and build alliances. Some villages were more resistant to his demands, refusing him 
entrance, and others were more welcoming, perhaps in the hope of gaining the protection 
of his clan. 1 6 0 
In response to claims of Kurdish violence against the Armenians, Colonel 
Chermside, the British consul in Erzurum, was commissioned by British officials to 
conduct a fact-finding mission in Van, Bitlis, and Mus in the summer of 1889. 
Chermside reported that there was significant tension between the Kurds and the 
Armenians and that the many of the educated Armenians in the cities were pro-West. He 
further added that many Armenians treated him as if he were a representative of their 
own government, and were more than willing to give him information about their feelings 
towards the Kurds and their own situation. 
Contrary to the hopes of many Armenians that he would find convincing evidence 
of the Porte's neglectfulness in providing security, Chermside reached the conclusion that 
relations between the Kurds and the Armenians had undergone a marked improvement 
from what they had been a decade before. "[0]utrages by the Kurds on Christians, inter­
tribal feuds, highway robbery, cattle lifting, all exist;" but "none appear to [be] as 
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1 6 1
 Consul Chermside to Sir W. White, Inclosure in no. 331, FO 424/162, p. 77, no. 80, in 
British Documents, ed. §imsir, 2: 659-664. 
1 6 2
 Although Chermside believes that the Ottoman economy was generally in recession. 
frequent and as wholesale as they were" ten years ago when he was last there. 1 6 1 Aside 
from the indiscretions of Musa Bey in the region of Mus, Kurdish attacks on Armenians 
were "rare." He also found that the Ottomans had managed to establish a significant 
presence in traditionally lawless and unruly regions, such as Hakkari and Bohtan. The 
Kurds, however, were afforded little participation in government affairs; Chermside 
wrote that he came across only two Kurdish functionaries in the government while he 
was there. The Ottomans were more likely to integrate the Kurds into the military as 
conscripts than into the administration. 
Chermside's report also described the social relationship between Kurds and 
Armenians throughout eastern Anatolia. Although the population of eastern Anatolia was 
no longer affected by war and famine, it continued to suffer as a result of the decline in 
trade and commerce. Feudalism continued to be dominant in more remote regions, 
particularly "Hakkari, Bohtan, and a great part of the Bitlis vilayet" where the Kurdish 
agas would collect the kabal tax from the Armenians rayahs, and most Christian villages 
were in abject poverty. As a result many Armenians emigrated from the countryside to 
the cities of Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van where the economy was relatively 
vibrant. 1 6 2 The majority of rural Armenians migrating to the urban areas found 
employment under the Armenian-dominated textile industry, which was continuing to 
experience growth during the 1880s as a result of Sultan Abdulhamid IPs military 
expansion and the consequent rising demand for uniforms. Agriculture, on the other 
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hand, was plummeting. 
Chermside's Armenian deputy Mr. Boyadjian agreed that Kurdish attacks against 
the Armenians had decreased significantly. Boyadjian expressed his belief that the 
Armenian newspaper Hayastan was merely spreading unsubstantiated rumors about 
increases in attacks and of a secret plot designed by the Kurds to take over the eastern 
164 
provinces. 
By 1889 several unconfirmed reports surfaced concerning Musa Bey's 
involvement in a number of savage attacks on Armenian villages, in which women were 
reportedly raped, crops pillaged, and villages plundered. After scores of Armenians, 
including a delegation from Mus, gathered in front of the house of the Patriarch in 
Kumkapi, Istanbul to protest Musa Bey's actions, the Ottomans finally inquired into the 
situation.1 6 5 Musa Bey sent a petition to the Sultan insisting that the claims against him 
were groundless and indicated his willingness to defend himself against such claims in 
court. Subsequently the Porte arraigned him in November 1889 and issued an edict that 
See Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 64-71. According to Krikorian's 
statistics the textiles industry was predominantly occupied by Armenians and served as a 
significant source of wealth for Armenians in urban and semiurban areas. See Armenians 
in the Service of the Ottoman Empire. 
1 6 4
 Arman J. Kirakossian and Arman Dzhonovich, British diplomacy and the Armenian 
question: From the 1830s to 1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Gomidas Insitute Books, 
2003), 153-156. Boyadjian was by and large more sympathetic towards the Kurds than 
many other Armenian officials. In a letter to Graves he writes: "The Kurds are a fine and 
intelligent race, but extremely poor. There not being sufficient arable land for cultivation 
and having no confidence in local authorities, they do not dare leave their mountain 
homes in order to pursue a lawful calling and thus gain livelihood; but being compelled 
by the instinct of want, they commit all sorts of depredations, and thus become the terror 
of the districts surrounding the mountains." Boyadjian to Graves. [No. 24] Harput, July 
18, 1892 (FO 424/172; FO 195/1766). 
1 6 5
 White to Salisbury, FO 424/162, p. 30, no. 37 in British Documents, ed. $imsir, 2: 
615. 
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all plaintiffs must bring their charges against him "in the regular way" and go 
immediately to Istanbul to submit a complaint. 1 6 6 Musa Bey had three charges brought 
against him: arson of a storage unit for agricultural tools, looting, and assault. At the end 
of the tribunal proceedings, however, the Ottoman court acquitted Musa Bey and allowed 
167 
him to return to Mus on the grounds of lack of evidence. 
The case of Musa Bey and his subsequent acquittal, which was widely publicized 
in Western newspapers, sparked the outrage of the British and Armenians who called for 
further investigation into the security situation in eastern Anatolia. Further reports began 
to surface that along with other Kurdish derebeys, Musa Bey had become emboldened by 
the court's decision and decided to take revenge on the Armenians responsible for outing 
them. 1 6 8 
The case of Musa Bey marks a significant breach of Armenian confidence not 
only in the Ottoman government, of which Armenians had been suspicious for years, but 
also the British government. The Armenian revolutionary message of independent 
action, as opposed to that of dependence on the Great Powers, aimed at independence and 
freedom, became increasingly popular throughout eastern Anatolia among the rayah, 
particularly those in the semiautonomous regions of Zeitoun and Sasun. 
The Emergence of the New Armenian Revolutionary 
During the mid-1880s Armenian revolutionary activity took a new turn. Since the 
secret societies that had been cropping up throughout cities with a high concentration of 
1
 §imsir, Documents Diplomatique Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes (Ankara: Turk 
Tarihi Kurumu Basimevi, 1985), 1: 53. 
i en 
Turquie, November 26, 1889, cited in British Documents, $imsir, 2: 667-670. 
1 6 8
 Svajian, 285. 
i f       
  l int. 166    
   
      
him to return to Mu~ on the grounds oflack of evidence. 167 
The case of us a ey and his subsequent acquittal, hich as idely publicized 
in estern ne spapers, sparked the outrage of the ritish and r enians ho called for 
further investigation into the security situation in eastern natolia. Further reports began 
to surface that along ith other urdish derebeys, usa ey had beco e e boldened by 
the court's decision and decided to take revenge on the r enians responsible for outing 
them. 1  
The case of usa ey arks a significant breach of r enian confidence not 
only in the tto an govern ent, of hich r enians had been suspicious for years, but 
also the ritish govern ent. The r enian revolutionary essage of independent 
action, as opposed to that of dependence on the reat Po ers, ai ed at independence and 
freedo , beca e increasingly popular throughout eastern natolia a ong the rayah, 
particularly those in the se iautono ous regions f eitoun and asun. 
    
    m
     
166 ~ ~ir, ents lo atique ns: ires enie nes 
 nn  
167 Turquie, November 26, 1889, cited in British Documents, ~im~ir, 2: 667-670. 
168 S .. 285 vaJlan, . 
87 
Nalbandian, 94. 
Armenians were easily dissolved by the Ottoman authorities, Armenian activists found 
greater success in developing societies outside of the Ottoman Empire. The most notable 
of these societies were the Armenakan, the Hunchaks, and the Dashnaks. 
The Armenakan Party was founded in Van in 1885 by Mkrtich Portugalian and a 
number of other prominent Armenians in Van. Portugalian himself was an educator who 
had been involved in a number of political activities before the Russo-Turkish War. He 
was part of the Altruistic Society, which had been established in Tokat in 1869, and the 
Ararathian society, established in Van in 1876, both of which promoted the spread of 
education to the Armenians. Through these societies he managed to build his network of 
contacts with high-ranking Armenians. Following the Russo-Turkish War, Portugalian 
sought support from the Great Powers, including the United States, in sponsoring the 
establishment of schools for both youth and adults. The higher education establishments 
for Armenian adults aroused the suspicion of the Ottomans who suspected these facilities 
to be promoting revolutionary ideas. For his activities he was exiled from Van to France, 
where he established the journal Armenia which advocated liberal democracy. Calling 
for self-determination for Armenians by means of revolutionary thought and action, 
including the dissemination of propaganda and military training, Armenia also promoted 
raising the awareness of the outside world of the situation in Armenia, sending financial 
aid to the 'homeland' to fund endeavors towards education and self-defense projects, and 
disseminating Portugalian's own political and social ideas. 1 6 9 "What made the party 
revolutionary," according to Hovannisian, "was its advocacy of self-reliance and armed 
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Richard G. Hovannisian, "The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire 1876 to 
1914," vol. 2, in The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, 213. 
1 7 1
 Nalbandian, 171-172. 
1 7 2
 Aram Ruben, Hai Heghapokhakani Me Hishataknere [Memoirs of an Armenian 
Revolutionary] (Los Angeles, 1952), II, 268-269. Also see Sonyel, 115. 
1 7 3
 Libaridian, 176. 
resistance against state terror."1 7 0 The party, however, did not openly advocate terrorism 
171 
as a political tactic, although "[this] policy was ignored by certain individuals." In 
1889 the Ottoman authorities stopped an Armenian caravan from at the border town of 
Baskale en route to Van for inspection. It was discovered that the traders were smuggling 
arms to an Armenian militia. Additionally the Ottomans discovered that they were 
carrying a letter from Mkrtich Portugalian which detailed a plot for revolution. As the 
Ottoman border guards motioned to arrest the traders, the local Armenians opened fire on 
172 
the Ottoman forces, leading to a number of casualties on both sides. 
Although Nalbandian claims that the party was exclusive in its selection of 
membership, not recruiting outside Turkey—let alone Van—other exiled members of the 
Armenakan party, particularly Mkritch Terlemezian, encouraged Armenians to forge ties 
with the Kurds to support them against the Ottomans. According to Libaridian, 
Terlemezian, whom he claims was the actual leader of the Armenakan party, "could not 
leave the Kurds out of his worldview" and advocated, in several articles in Armenia, "the 
173 
translation of objective realities into a common political program." 
The Hunchak (Bell) Party was founded in Geneva in 1887 by a group of six 
Armenian students, although it was not called such until 1890. Party members boasted 
their adherence to Marxist ideology, but their culture and mentality bore the semblance of 
rror.,,170  
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Anahide Ter Minassian, "The Role of the Armenian Community in the Foundation 
and Development of the Socialist Movement in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1876-
1923," in Social and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Mete Tuncay and Erik 
Ziircher (London; New York: British Academic Press in association with the 
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, 1994), 112. 
1 7 5
 Nalbandian, 109. 
populism.1 7 4 Originally sympathizing with the cause of Portugalian's Armenakan Party, 
having published numerous articles in his journal, they pressed for a more militant 
version of Armenian nationalism. Finding that Portugalian would not support their more 
radical viewpoint, they decided to establish their own party and started publishing 
material openly criticizing the Armenakan journal Armenia. In time the party formulated 
a more concrete agenda by which it would try to achieve its goal of an independent 
Armenia which would include the eastern provinces. First they sought to tear down the 
old orders of power in Armenian society and develop a new nationalist order in its place, 
based on the principles of socialism and humanitarianism. 
A common theme in Hunchak rhetoric was not only Ottoman exploitation of the 
Armenians, but also the oppressive nature of the authority of the Armenian patriarch. It 
envisaged an Armenia whose citizens were ruled by an elected legislative assembly, 
enjoyed absolute freedom of speech, press, assembly, and organization, performed 
175 
military service, had full access to education; and paid taxes according to their income. 
Unlike the Armenakan, which advocated "revolution" through education and nonviolent 
resistance, the Hunchak party advocated immediate social action, widespread 
demonstrations, and brute force as means of achieving independence. Nalbandian writes 
that the Hunchaks believed that the political situation of the Armenians could actually be 
altered by using a combination of "propaganda, agitation, terror, organization, and 
ulism.174    Port '   
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peasant and worker activities." 
The Hunchaks were not entirely opposed to assistance from any of the European 
Powers, but they insisted that the Powers should not intervene in the internal affairs of the 
Armenians, since the cause of Armenian independence was to be undertaken by the 
Armenians themselves. In an excerpt from the first editorial of the journal Hunchak such 
independent resolve is stated: 
if we fold our hands and wait for European intervention, the Armenian people will 
sink into unbearable misfortune.... [w]e must add that the present policy and 
diplomacy of the European Powers is like a windmill—it turns in this direction of 
the wind today, while tomorrow, according to the pleasures of the same wind, it 
may turn in the opposite direction. 
The Hunchaks operated as an underground organization based in Istanbul with a 
large network of Armenian supporters throughout Europe, Russia, and the United States. 
Their main areas of interest were initially in the main cities in eastern Anatolia. Since 
they were rivals of the Armenakans, who were strong in Van, the Hunchaks had little 
appeal in the Van region. They had some success in Erzurum, undertaking the 
construction of a foundry that manufactured arms in 1890. The project to arm the 
Armenians through the production of weapons within the Ottoman Empire failed after 
skirmishes between a number of Armenians and Muslims in Erzurum in June 1890 in 
which the revolutionaries were easily overcome. 1 7 8 The Hunchaks were also bitterly 
opposed to the Patriarch and carried out a plot to assassinate him in 1890. White reported 
to the Marquis of Salisbury about a riot staged by the Hunchak revolutionaries at Kum 
Kapi, Istanbul in August 1890: "The riot was apparently got up against the Patriarch. An 
1 7 6
 Ibid., 110. 
1 7 7
 Cited in Ibid., 115-116. 
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 Said Pasha to Rustem Pasha, June 27, 1890, Turkey no. 1 (1890-91), pp. 50-51, no. 
62/1, cited in British Documents, ed. $imsir, 2: 701. 
1 7 9
 Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury, Therapia, August 21, 1890, Turkey no. 1 
(1890-1891), p. 66, no. 86, in British Documents, ed. §imsir, 2: 712. 
1 8 0
 Libaridian, 103, 106. 
Armenian wilfully fired at his Beatitude, and subsequently killed a gendarme after the 
police had been brought into the church in order to restore order amongst the rioters." 
Following the Ottoman's quelling of the Erzurum and Kum Kapi incidents, the Hunchaks 
moved their center of operations to the more remote and mountainous regions of Sasun 
and Zeitoun where the Armenians were more independent of Ottoman intervention. 
The Dashnak party, also known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(ARF), was organized in Tiflis in the 1890s. It was formed from a merger between 
various other Armenian revolutionary groups in the Caucasus who were united in their 
anti-Ottoman and anti-Czarist sentiments. At their inception the Dashnak and Hunchak 
parties had few differences between them, although one major difference surfaced over 
the question of the devolution of power. Whereas the Hunchaks favored a more 
centralized administration of their organization, the Dashnaks sought to decentralize 
power into the hands of a representative body of Armenians. Another major difference 
between the two parties was over ideology. Although the Dashnak party was based on 
socialist principles, and even formed an alliance with the Hunchaks for a brief period, 
they were arguably less prone to populism and advocated more careful and drawn-out 
stages of preparation before commencing revolutionary activity. The Hunchaks, by 
contrast, favored swift armed action against the government. The Hunchaks later 
disassociated themselves with the Dashnaks in 1891 on the grounds that they were 
insufficiently Marxist. 1 8 0 Towards the mid-1890s, the rift between the Dashnaks, the 
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Hunchaks, and Armenakans grew. In his memoirs, the prominent Dashnak activist 
Vahan Papazian reveals his disdain for the Hunchak and Armenakan parties: 
we did all we could to reach common ground with the Henchaks and the 
Armenakans. Because of their conservative and fanatical elements, and—I must 
confess—some of our careless and ignorant members.. .armies of foes formed 
against us, composed of the most humble groups in our society. It was not a 
struggle of ideas, but rather a vulgar animosity, with no holds barred, just to 
conquer a few villages.... This 'activity' was more evident in the Armenakan and 
Henchak parties, because they did not have competent leaders, and there was no 
181 
party discipline in their ranks. 
The Dashnak party was open to the possibility of forming alliances with Arabs, 
Kurds, Turks, and peoples in the Balkans as a means of gaining support for the cause, 
which would lessen the necessity for an alliance with the Russians or the British, for both 
of whom they had developed deep distrust. The Dashaks also attempted to form an 
alliance with the Kurds. In Droshak, the Dashnak newspaper, there were letters written 
in Kurdish summoning the tribal leaders to join the party and thus to create a more 
formidable resistance to Ottoman forces. It warned the Kurds to not "fall into the traps" 
of the Ottoman government, which was attempting to lure them into its military, and in 
fact many Kurdish tribal leaders in the Dersim area were receptive to the bid of the 
Dashnaks. Keri of Erzincan, a Dashnak representative, resided with the Kurdish tribes in 
Dersim during the mid-1890s spreading revolutionary ideas among them. It even 
initiated dialogue with Kasim Bey, the brother of Musa Bey, and attempted to curry favor 
182 
with the Kimlik tribe which was predominant in the Mus and Dersim regions. 
Vahan Papazian, Im Hushere, [My Memoires], vol. 1, (Boston: Hairenik, 1950), 353, 
cited in Marc Nichanian, Writers of Disaster: Armenian Literature in the Twentieth 
Century, (Reading: Taderon, by arrangement with the 
Gomidas Institute, 2002), 182. 
182 
Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question (Sirkeci, Istanbul: 
Documentary Publications, 1988), 801-802. 
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During the early 1890s there was not only rivalry between the clergy and the 
revolutionaries for power, but also between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox Armenian 
populations. Boyadjian reported a case of a family rivalry between Armenian families in 
the Harput region in the villages of Haim and Blaidar, one Catholic and the other 
183 
Orthodox, in which both sides hired the services ofKurds toki l l theother . , O J It was 
largely because of the religious rivalry among the different Armenian sects that the 
revolutionaries had appeal: they stood for Armenian unity and equality rather than 
religious supremacy. 
The Formation of the Hamidiye Cavalry 
Abdulhamid IPs policy of alliance building with the Kurds during the 1880s and 
1890s won him the affectionate title of have kurdan (father of the Kurds in Kurdish). His 
creation of the predominantly Kurdish Hamidiye Cavalry Regiment is a manifestation of 
his attempts to integrate the Kurds into the state through diplomacy. Zeki Pasha, the 
commander of the 4 t h brigade in Erzincan, was put in charge of the organization and 
command of the Hamidiye cavalry. As Zeki Pasha was of Circassian origin and well-
acquainted with the geography of eastern Anatolia, he was considered an ideal candidate 
for the position. In November 1890 he summoned a number of prominent Kurdish tribal 
chiefs to Erzurum to discuss the arrangement of cavalry organization of the cavalry. 
Some of the larger tribes were to form entire regiments on their own and lend 800-1000 
of their men to the cavalry. Smaller tribes were attached to regiments led by larger tribes. 
Gradually the number of regiments increased; there were 40 regiments in 1892 and 56 in 
1 8 3
 Rustem Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to London, to Said Pasha, Ottoman Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, London: Feb. 22, 1890, No. 13690/49, in Documents Diplomatique 
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The main motive behind the formation of the Hamidiye was to centralize 
government control over eastern Anatolia for the immediate purpose of providing 
security against internal rebellion and thus to stave off Russian and British intervention. 
Abdulhamid II stated the following in his memoirs concerning the Hamidiye: 
These Kurdish regiments, which are fashioned after the manner of the Russian 
[Cossacks], can be of great service to us. Additionally the 'concept of obedience' 
that they will learn in the army will be beneficial to them. The Kurdish agas to 
whom we have given the title of officer will be esteemed in their new positions 
and a number will make an effort to enter by force. The Hamidiye 
Regiments...will become a valuable army.... I know that I am criticized for 
bringing the children of some of the Kurdish agas to Istanbul and installing them 
in certain offices. [But] for years the Christian Armenians have occupied 
positions in the ministry. What harm can there be to draw the Kurds, who are of 
our same religion, nearer to us?... I am convinced I am in the right in the Kurdish 
policy that I have undertaken. Zeki Pasa, who has examined the [political] 
situation at hand [in eastern Anatolia], has shown the most effective way in 
185 
putting forth the idea of forming regiments from Kurdish Cossacks. 
There is considerable debate over the role of the Hamidiye regiments in the 
Armenian massacres. One camp asserts that the development of the cavalry was part of 
Abdulhamid IPs Pan-Islamic vision of integrating the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, a 
large majority of whom lived relatively isolated tribal lifestyles, into the state. Bayram 
Kodaman is one of the leading proponents of this notion, stressing that the creation of the 
Hamidiye regiment was innocuous, generally beneficial, and generally accorded with 
other integration projects for Muslims in the hinterlands. The Ottomans created the asiret 
mektebi (the tribal office) for the children of leading Arab and Kurdish tribal chiefs, the 
Ottoman, ed. §imsir, 74. 
1 8 4
 Bayram Kodaman, "Hamidiye Hafif Siivari Alaylan (II. Abdulhamid ve Dogu 
Asiretleri)," [The Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments], Tank Dergisi 32, (1979), 463. 
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saray muhafiz birligi (palace guard union) for the Albanians, and the Hamidiye regiments 
for the Kurds. The creation of the regiment had the added benefit of impeding the 
Armenian revolutionaries from creating a state, but served the main purpose of providing 
protection.1 8 6 The Ottomans' "random" policies of favoritism to one tribe over the other 
187 
caused "jealousy and competition among the tribes" and eventually led to "infighting," 
which in turn spread to affect the Armenians. 
Others view Abdulhamid's reasoning behind the creation of the Hamidiye as 
directed towards thwarting the Armenian revolutionaries by any means possible. 
According to Nalbandian, the Hamidiye not only strengthened Sultan Abdulhamid IPs 
"Pan Islamic policy," but also "provided a method of separating the Moslem Kurds from 
188 
possible cooperation with the discontented Armenians." She goes on to state that 
Abdulhamid's real purpose was to incite the Kurds against the Armenians by "allowing" 
them to engage in murderous activity with impunity. 
The more pertinent question remains, however, if the purpose of the Hamidiye 
was merely to incorporate the Kurds into the system more fully and provide security in 
eastern Anatolia (especially at a time when the British Consul in Erzurum and his 
Armenian deputy were reporting conditions in eastern Anatolia to be more secure and 
that the Porte was already establishing connections with various tribal chiefs), why 
Abdulhamid II did not form such an additional cavalry regiment until over a decade after 
1 8 5
 Sultan Abdulhamid II, Sultan Abdulhamid'in Hatira Defteri, ed. Ismet Bozdag 
(Istanbul: Pinar, 1986), 75. 
1 8 6
 Kodaman, Osmanh Devrinde Dogu Anadolu 'nun Idari Durumu [The Adminstrative 
Situation of Eastern Anatolia in the Ottoman Period] (Ankara: Anadolu Basin Birligi, 
1986), 91. 
1 8 7
 Kodaman, "Hamidiye Hafif Suvari Alaylan," 463. 
1 8 8
 Nalbandian, 161. 
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Klein, "Power in the Periphery," 6. 
a the Russo-Turkish War. 
The establishment of the Hamidiye regiment in the early 1890s was part of 
Abdulhamid IPs centralization effort. According Janet Klein, Abdulhamid was intent on 
"bringing] the region in the Ottoman fold, and to ensure, by almost any means 
necessary, that it remained there." 1 8 9 The mechanisms by which the Kurds and 
Armenians had been contained in eastern Anatolia in 1880s had a number of limits. 
Putting security measures in practice necessitated disarming of the tribes, settling the 
nomads, blockading certain migration routes, and installing security checkpoints 
throughout eastern Anatolia and on the borders with Russia and Iran. Completely 
disarming the Kurdish population proved nearly impossible; not only had the Ottomans 
distributed weapons among the Kurds during the 1860s and 1870s when they employed 
them as basibozuks, but the Kurds had been smuggling weapons across the porous 
borders of Iran for years. Settling Kurdish nomads throughout eastern Anatolia 
necessitated stationing troops across relatively unknown territory. Securing mountainous 
areas such as Dersim, Sasun, Zeitoun and Hakkari was a perpetual struggle for Ottoman 
forces which, although easily able to rout Kurdish, Armenian, and Nestorian insurgents, 
could not contain them. As a means of settling the tribes, one of the key security 
measures that the British officials required of the Ottomans, the Porte had established 
checkpoints throughout eastern Anatolia throughout the 1880s. One of the main 
problems with the checkpoints, however, was that they were difficult to maintain 
completely secure, since guards were often venal and did little to implement proper 
security. Again Ottoman security measures could only control the activities of the 
 i  
 t f  i i  t  l    t  
iil i  I'  ti  rt.  t iil i    
[i     t  
   ere.,,189     
        f 
    t   f   
     
  li     
        
     
.)lbozuks,     
  
     
  
   
  
l   




189  . 
97 
Armenian revolutionaries to the extent that they visibly organized within the Empire. 
The Ottoman government was much less capable of dealing with the well-organized 
network of Armenian revolutionaries operating outside the Empire and infiltrating 
Armenian society within its borders through underground means. 
The Hamidiye cavalry served the ultimate purpose of balancing the power of the 
Armenian revolutionaries, whose rise to greater power is the most likely reason why the 
sultan stepped up his policy of integrating the Kurds into the Ottoman military system 
and containing the centrifugal elements in Kurdish society. 
The formation of the Hamidiye unit included several recruitment challenges. One 
was that being in or commanding a regiment was a coveted position with a number of 
advantages, including the right to bear arms and status in the military, and engendered 
rivalry between tribes. As such the Porte secretly appointed many of the tribes to the 
cavalry in order to stave off internal disputes. Notwithstanding the advantages that 
membership in the Hamidiye offered, many Kurdish tribal chiefs initially had 
reservations about joining up, suspecting that it would subdue their freedom. The 
Kurdish chiefs in the Dersim region saw the Ottoman initiative as a means of spreading 
Sunnism in their predominantly Alevi abode. 1 9 0 
Already in November 1891, not long after the creation of the regiments, reports 
surfaced concerning various problems surrounding the Hamidiye. Many of the tribes, it 
was found, were much like the ba§ibozuks in that they were insubordinate to Ottoman 
command and abused their military power. The British Consul in Erzurum wrote: 
The formation of the new Kurdish cavalry appears so far to have but little 
restraining effect on these outrages, in which many members, and even prominent 
1 9 0
 Kodaman, "Hamidiye Hafif Siivan Alaylan," 447. 
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officers of the new force, are accused of taking part.... It is said that the Kurds of 
the Sibkanlu tribe, who are members of the new cavalry avail themselves of that 
pretext to take forage, food, etc., from the villagers of Alashgerd without 
payment. This system of military robbery has hitherto been the speciality of the 
police and regular cavalry patrols. 1 9 1 
Several other consular reports detail the involvement of those who appeared to be 
members of the cavalry regiments in criminal activity. 
The Ottomans were particularly keen on recruiting the more powerful tribes into 
the Hamidiye. In one case it even offered amnesty to Mustafa Pasha, a prominent 
Kurdish leader of the Miran tribe in the Bohtan-Cizre area, who was facing charges for 
stealing hundreds of sheep from a merchant in Urfa, in exchange for his participation in 
the Hamidiye. 1 9 2 Mustafa Pasha's appointment to the Hamidiye only served to confirm 
the suspicions of many locals, including Armenians and Kurds already angered over the 
acquittal of Musa Bey, that the Porte would turn a blind eye to Kurdish criminal activity 
to suit its own socio-political interests in the region. 
Another issue that surfaced in consular reports concerned the actual strength and 
size of the regiment. The French Consul in Erzurum testified that many of the Kurds 
"have neither a horse nor the means to buy one." The Ottoman prohibition on the import 
of certain breeds of horses into eastern Anatolia (perhaps implemented as a means of 
preventing the Kurds from building a military), according to the official, caused the horse 
breeders, for lack of a market, to "abandon the industry." The report goes on to say that 
Zeki Pasha was obligated to content himself with the amount of horses provided to him, 
but doubted his ability to build a sustainable cavalry: "In order to not go back on his 
1 9 1
 Hampson to White. Erzurum, Nov. 7, 1891 (FO 195/1729/F0424/169), cited in Klein, 
"Power in the Periphery, 51. 
1 9 2
 Klein, "Power in the Periphery," 52. 
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Wigoreaux to Ambassador Cambon, No. 21, Dec. 5, 1891, cited in Klein, "Power in 
the Periphery," 54-55. 
1 9 4
 Graves to Ford, no. 38. Erzurum, June 22, 1892 (FO 195/1766; FO 424/172), cited in 
Klein, "Power in the Periphery," 58-59. 
1 9 5
 van Bruinessen, "Kurds, States, and Tribes," in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in the Middle East, ed. Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi Books, 
2002). " 
promise.. .to raise forty or fifty regiments.. .he has lined up regiments which [in reality] 
are but a mere smokescreen." 
Many reports in 1892 and 1893 criticize the Hamidiye for its overall lack of 
training, organization, and reliable equipment. Consul Graves attended a pageant 
organized by Zeki Pasha in Erzurum in which the newly created regiments paraded 
alongside the regular troops. The Hamidiye cavalry, who totaled approximately 1500, 
marched behind the regular troops in the parade. "With the exception of some of the 
chiefs," observes Graves, "the Kurdish horsemen had made little or no attempt at 
uniformity in any respect, and the great majority of their horses were of very inferior 
quality.. .[M]ost of them carried Martini and Berdan carbines, besides other very 
miscellaneous weapons, and.. .there were a large number of elderly men and very young 
boys in their ranks." 1 9 4 
The irregular Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments had an impact on Kurdish and 
Armenian society remarkably similar to that of the basibozuks three decades earlier: they 
weakened the power structure in Kurdish society and impeded the formation of Kurdish 
confederations under the leadership of a powerful bey or sheikh. Van Bruinessen 
captures the ongoing effect that the different periods of Ottoman policy had on the Kurds: 
The tribal entities that we see articulating themselves in each consecutive phase of 
administrative centralization became correspondingly smaller, less complicated, 
and more genealogically homogeneous: emirates gave way to tribal confederacies, 
confederacies to large tribes, larges tribes to smaller ones . 1 9 5 
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From Tension to Conflict 
The conflict between Kurds and Armenians in the mid-1890s can be understood 
as the culmination of conflict between the Ottoman state and the Armenian 
revolutionaries that trickled down into the lower ranks of society. It began in June 1893 
in Mus. In a letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, Consul Graves reported that the administrative 
district of Mus had recently come under economic hardship, "partly owing to the failure 
of the crops last year and the gloomy prospects of this year's harvest, and partly owing to 
the insecurity resulting from Kurdish lawlessness." Damadian, a notorious Hunchak 
revolutionary, was residing in Sasun and reportedly encouraging the Kurds to revolt 
against the Armenians, although he had been captured by Ottoman authorities earlier in 
the month. The Hunchaks were also beginning to spread rumors of Kurdish massacres of 
Armenians, many of which were found to be untrue. Nevertheless the rumors prompted 
government officials to intervene and search for weapons. The arrest of the Armenian 
bishop of Mus on charges of sedition, for his alleged communication with Damadian, 
made many of the Armenians in the region increasingly bitter towards the Ottomans. 1 9 6 
In July 1893 the Ottomans lifted restrictions on the passage of the nomadic 
Kurdish Bekran tribe through the Sasun mountains, which had always passed through 
annually before the new security measures. The Bekran reportedly met with resistance 
upon their entrance into a village in the predominantly Armenian Talori region, 
1 0*7 
whereupon they killed the resisters and plundered the village, leaving nine Armenians 
i y b
 Consul Graves to Sir A. Nicolson, Erzurum, June 28, 1893, FO 424/175, 1893, pp. 
138-139, no. 136, in British Documents, §imsir, 3: 236-238. 
1 9 7
 Said Pasha to Rustem Pasha, Sublime Porte July 20, 1893, in Documents 
Diplomatiques Ottomans, $imsir, 355. 
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1 9 9
 Zeki Pasha to the Office of General Staff, July 22, 1894, in Ottoman Archives: Yddiz 
Collection, The Armenian Question: The Talori Incidents, ed. Okte, 1: 101- 103. 
and three Muslims dead. Subsequently Mustafa Pasha of the Hamidiye regiments was 
sent to restore order to the region. However, he ended up arrested a number of 
Armenians whom the British Consul Graves believed to be of the "aggrieved party." In 
other reports officials suspected a government conspiracy which secretly incited the 
Muslims of Bitlis to rise up against the Armenians thus putting an end to the relative 
autonomy of the region. 
According to Ottoman documents it was the Armenians were regularly accused of 
stirring up activity among the tribes. Zeki Pasha claims in a telegram to the Porte that the 
army was sent only in order to keep Armenian separatists from inciting violence in the 
Talori and Mus regions. Military forces were dispatched to the Mus region "to check ill-
intentions and separatist activities of Armenians" which were blocking the "annual safe 
passage" of the Bekran tribe, which was "blocked by the governorship of Bitlis for the 
past couple of years due to groundless and misleading complaints of the said separatists." 
Troops were dispatched in order to prevent Armenian misdeeds (fesaddt) and acts of 
hostility (sekavet-i merviyeler).199 
This incident came in a particular sore spot in eastern Anatolia. While the 
massacre of Armenians by Kurds in another region may have gone relatively unnoticed, 
the Hunchaks, who had gained increasingly popularity in the early 1890s, set up one of 
their bases in Sasun, primarily because of its relative remoteness from Ottoman 
gendarmes. Sonyel writes: "the Armenian revolutionaries operated by preference in areas 
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where the Armenians were in a hopeless minority, so that reprisals would be certain."2 0 0 
The incident, although relatively small, fit the leitmotif which Armenian revolutionaries 
and their sympathizers sought to accentuate regarding the situation of the Armenian 
peasantry. The Hunchaks deliberately incited the Ottomans and the Hamidiye cavalry to 
intervene by attacking gendarme stations, cutting telegraph wires, bombing government 
buildings, and raiding Kurdish villages in the hope that this would provoke widespread 
Armenian revolt. 
Although actual membership of the Hunchak party was small, it gained 
widespread support from Armenians abroad, and throughout eastern Anatolia. 
Mavroyeni Bey, the Ottoman Envoy at Washington (himself an Armenian), wrote to 
American Secretary of State Gresham in 1893, calling attention to a resolution drafted by 
Armenian missionaries in Pennsylvania which expressed sympathy with the aims of the 
revolutionaries. The resolution reiterated the provisions of Article 61 of the Treaty of 
Berlin and stressed the Ottoman government's failure to comply with it. According to 
Mavroyeni's statement: 
The civilized world was justified in expecting prompt amelioration of the 
deplorable state of affairs in Armenia, but instead oppression and anarchy have 
since increasingly prevailed.... [FJerocious and uncivilized Kurds and 
Circassians... continue with impunity to rob, burn and devastate, to torture, 
violate and murder. 2 0 2 
During the winter of 1893 and the spring of 1894 the Hunchak revolutionaries 
built up their forces in the mountains and the Bekran Kurds exacted revenge against the 
Armenians villages. In June 1894 the villagers of Talori refused to pay taxes unless 
2 0 0
 Sonyel, 156-157. 
2 0 1
 Ibid., 157. 
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proper action was taken to prevent the Kurdish tribes from attacking them. According to 
the Consul Graves' account the kaimmakam of Mus came down to Talori to dissolve the 
protestors by "abus[ing] them and maltreat[ing] them." The Turkish version, however, 
states that the kaimmakam was greeted by a group of armed Hunchak sympathizers. 
Subsequently the kaimmakam summoned military help from the mutessarif 'of Gence in 
order to disperse the Armenians. The arrival of the army provoked the Armenians to 
stage an insurrection in which they punished the surrounding Kurdish villages. Kurds 
responded by destroying the Armenian villages of $enik and Semal, which were Hunchak 
strongholds. The Hamidiye cavalry was subsequently ordered from Erzincan to pursue a 
203 
force of some 10,000 Armenians lodged in Mount Andok. 
According to the Ottomans the Hamidiye regiment was pulled back before it 
entered Mount Andok. Vice-Consul Hallward in the consulate at Van relays the Ottoman 
version: 
The Bekiranli [Bekran] Kurds who come from Diarbekir to pass the summer on 
the Antogh Dagh [Mount Andok] where there are several large Armenian 
villages, made a raid on the Armenians, and carried off cattle and other plunder. 
The Armenians, in hope of recovering their property, made an attack on the 
Kurds, and in the encounter two or three persons on either side lost their lives. 
The affair was greatly exaggerated by the Governor of Bitlis, who applied for a 
large number of the troops in order to suppress the disturbance. About the middle 
of August seven battalions of troops and one Hamidieh Regiment arrived here. 
The Hamidieh Regiment, however, never got as far as the Antogh Mountains, and 
left after ten days . 2 0 4 
However, the Armenian revolutionaries give a significantly different report of the 
incident. According to the Armenian historian Varandian, the Hunchaks were "in a weak 
Mavroyeni Bey to Mr. Gresham, Washington, November 5, 1893, No. 6716/18 in 
Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans, ed. $imsir, 496. 
2 0 3
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verSIOn: 
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the Antogh Dagh [Mount Andok] where there are several large Armenian 
villages, made a raid on the Armenians, and carried off cattle and other plunder. 
The Armenians, in hope of recovering their property, made an attack on the 
Kurds, and in the encounter two or three persons on either side lost their lives. 
The affair was greatly exaggerated by the Governor of Bitlis, who applied for a 
large number of the troops in order to suppress the disturbance. About the middle 
of August seven battalions of troops and one Hamidieh Regiment arrived here. 
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However, the Armenian revolutionaries give a significantly different report of the 
incident. According to the Armenian historian Varandian, the Hunchaks were "in a weak 
202   189 , . 1




 Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, October 4, 1897, FO 424/178, p. 213, no. 231, 
in British Documents, ed. $imsir, 3; 384. 
2 0 5
 Mikael Varandian, History of the Dashnaktsutiun (Paris, 1932), 146. 
position" and "anxious to do something as quick as possible to cause a stir." While the 
Armenians were equipped to fend off an onslaught by the local Kurds, they were not 
strong enough to overcome the Ottoman troops: 
In August 1894 the Armenians annihilated the Kurds after a successful onslaught 
and were about to carry off their flocks when they were suddenly surrounded on 
all sides by troops. No one has ever been able to give even an approximate 
number of the Armenians killed. Some say six or seven thousand, others say 
205 
around one thousand. Probably the latter is nearer the truth. 
While the exact course of events will probably always be shrouded in nationalist 
rhetoric, the Sasun incident ushered in widespread political and social chaos throughout 
eastern Anatolia. Hunchak sympathizers throughout the major cities of eastern Anatolia 
rose in rebellion against the government and the Kurds. Fearing an Armenian takeover, 
many prominent Kurdish leaders crushed Armenian villages. Likewise Armenian 
revolutionaries led Armenian militias to wipe out Kurdish villages. Overall, the conflict 
was predominantly between the Kurds and the Armenians, many of whom were 
manipulated by the Ottomans and Hunchaks, respectively, to take military action and 
many of whom fought for sheer survival. While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
touch on the issue of culpability it is worth looking at a couple of instances of violence 
between Kurds and Armenians. 
The Hunchaks had been amassing power around Diyarbakir quite rapidly during 
1894. An outbreak of cholera in the region served the Hunchak's purposes of instigating 
conflict, as they accused the Ottomans of failing to provide treatment for the Armenians 
affected by the epidemic, thus gaining further sympathies with the Ottoman locals. The 
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While the exact course of events will probably always be shrouded in nationalist 
rhetoric, the Sasun incident ushered in widespread political and social chaos throughout 
eastern Anatolia. Hunchak sympathizers throughout the major cities of eastern Anatolia 
rose in rebellion against the government and the Kurds. Fearing an Annenian takeover, 
many prominent Kurdish leaders crushed Annenian villages. Likewise Annenian 
revolutionaries led Annenian militias to wipe out Kurdish villages. Overall, the conflict 
was predominantly between the Kurds and the Annenians, many of whom were 
manipulated by the Ottomans and Hunchaks, respectively, to take military action and 
many of whom fought for sheer survival. While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
touch on the issue of culpability it is worth looking at a couple of instances of violence 
between Kurds and Annenians. 
The Hunchaks had been amassing power around Diyarbakir quite rapidly during 
1894. An outbreak of cholera in the region served the Hunchak's purposes of instigating 
conflict, as they accused the Ottomans of failing to provide treatment for the Annenians 
affected by the epidemic, thus gaining further sympathies with the Ottoman locals. The 
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Claire Mouradian, "Gustave Meyrier and the Turmoil in Diarbekir, 1894-1896," in 
Armenian Tigranaker/Diarbekir and Edessa/Urfa, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa 
Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2006), 215. 
2 0 7
 Ibid., 217. 
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 §evket Beysanoglu, Kultiirumuzde Diyarbakiir (Ankara: San Matbaasi, 1992), 12. 
poor state of the economy in the rural areas created an influx of Armenian in-migration to 
Diyarbakir. Unable to find work, many of the migrants were attracted to the Hunchak 
revolutionary message. In October 1895 the vali Sim Pasa, who was regarded as more 
benevolent, was replaced by the infamous Enis Pasa, the former mutes arr if of Mardin, 
who had a year earlier "shown hostility toward the Capuchin fathers and especially 
toward Father Salvadore, who would be assassinated in November 1895." According 
to Meyrier, Enis Pasha pressured local Armenian clergymen to give their allegiance to 
hirn as acting vali. This gesture upset the Armenian population who closed their 
207 
churches and bazaar in protest against the clergymen who complied with his orders. 
Only spiritual and tribal leaders from among the Kurds were present at Enis Pasha's 
208 
inauguration ceremony in late October; "no non-Muslims were found." 
Rioting broke out on Friday, November 1, 1895. Shops throughout the city were 
set ablaze and fighting continued for three days. A telegraph from Suleyman Nazif, an 
administrator in Diyarbakir carrying four hundred signatures appealed for government 
intervention to calm down the scene of violence throughout the vilayet and accused the 
Armenians of pitting the Muslims against each other: "We want justice. The Armenian 
traitors' aim is to break the state's sacred bond between the caliphate and the Islamic 
people, who are most brave and noble." 2 0 9 Further rioting and conflict spread throughout 
the countryside. According to Ottoman reports the death toll was approximately seventy 
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Muslims and three hundred Armenians. Meyrier estimates the death toll throughout 
the vilayet to be near 15,000.2 1 1 
Hunchaks also penetrated the region of Zeitoun during 1894 and 1895, arming the 
Armenian inhabitants and indoctrinating them with revolutionary rhetoric. It was 
reported that Zeitoun had become a place of refuge for Armenians fleeing Maras and 
Iskenderun. In November 1895 a force of some 4,000 rebels out of a population of some 
35,000 staged an insurrection throughout the region which resulted in approximately 
1,250 casualties. The Ottoman forces finally defeated them in December after cutting off 
212 
food and ammunition supplies. 
Just as the conflict in eastern Anatolia was beginning to abate, however, a 
rebellion broke out in Van in March 1896. Kurdish attacks on four Armenian villages in 
March had prompted Ottoman officials to send Sadettin Pasha into Van to restore order. 
Unlike other areas of eastern Anatolia, the Hunchaks were unpopular in Van. However, 
the Dashnaks still played a revolutionary role. According to the British Consul in Van 
the Dashnak revolutionaries managed to mobilize a force of some six hundred 
213 
Armenians, arm them with Russian rifles, and dress them in "distinctive uniforms." 
The revolutionaries apparently used tactics similar to the Hunchaks in that they sought, 
either through direction instigation or deception, to provoke unrest in order to gain 
international attention. In his account of Kurdish-Armenian relations in Van, Sadettin 
Pasha writes of an incident of deception in the village of Kiziltas in the mountains south 
of Van: 
2 1 0
 Ibid., 15-16. 
2 1 1
 Mouradian, 219. 
2 1 2
 Uras, 750. 
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I saw three-fourths Kurds in all of the villages in the surroundings. I asked 
whether or not these [Kurds] were of the [village] people. They said that the 
[Kurds] were not of the village and that they were guards hired by the [local] 
Armenians. Nevertheless in the village of Kiziltas approximately 400 sheep were 
still stolen even while the Kurdish guards were there. Since this matter caught my 
attention, I pursued it further by asking the kaimmakam of Vestan: 
He said: "this is a trick of Van Bishop. The local Van Kurdish beys also benefit 
from this.... The Bishop wants that Armenians to appear oppressed.... By giving 
30-40 liras to the Kurds they bring them to the villages as guards. This sum 
mainly comes from the Van elites. The thefts that occur in the villages is done by 
these guards at the behest of the Armenians."2 1 4 
The conflict in the mid-1890s was not only a power struggle between the 
Armenian revolutionaries and the Ottoman Empire, but among and within different 
segments of Kurdish and Armenian society. One of the main problems with eastern 
Anatolia was that Sultan Abdulhamid IPs administration had never managed to rearrange 
the social arrangements in eastern Anatolia and integrate the Kurds and Armenians fully 
into the state. According to Lynch, feudalism and serfdom continued to exist in many of 
the more rural regions: 
Serfdom is an institution which is not unknown in the country, though its 
existence is softened over by the Turkish authorities, who shrink from dispensing 
a purely nominal sovereignty. The serfs, who are Armenians, are known as zer 
kurri, signifying bought with gold. In fact they are bought and sold in much the 
same manner as sheep and cattle by the Kurdish beys and aghas. The only 
difference is that they cannot be disposed of individually; they are transferred 
with the lands which they cultivate. The chief appropriates as much as he wishes 
from their yearly earnings, capital or goods; and in return he provides them with 
protection against other Kurdish tribes. Many stories are told to illustrate the 
nature of the relation. A serf was shot by the servant of a Kurdish agha who 
possessed lands in the neighborhood. The owner of the serf did not trouble to 
avenge his death on the person of the murder, still less upon that of the agha, his 
neighbor. He rode over to the agha's lands, and put bullets through two of his 
2 1 3
 Ibid., 757. 
2 1 4
 Sami Onal, Sadettin Pasa 'nin Anrfan: Ermeni-Kurt Olaylari (Van, 1896) [The 
Memoires of Sadettin Pasha: Armenian-Kurdish Episodes] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 
2003), 148. 
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serfs, the first that he happened to meet . 2 1 5 
By the mid-1890s, Armenians were either connected with the revolutionaries or with the 
clergy. There were representatives in Armenian society on both sides that guided the 
behavior of the Armenians, but Ottoman policy kept such a representative figure from 
ever emerging in Kurdish society during this period. Some of the Hamidiye cavalry 
regiments cooperated with Ottoman military commanders, whereas others were 
insubordinate. The nomadic Kurdish tribes tended to plunder Armenian villages and kill 
the inhabitants, whereas settled Kurds tended to have better relations with the Armenians. 
Many of the Kurds appeared to believe that the spread of Islam among the 
Armenians was the best method of achieving power. The nomadic Omerli tribe in the 
Diyarbakir vilayet came down from the mountains to avenge the death of one its 
members. Upon reaching the village of the Armenians whom they believed were 
responsible, they offered three alternatives that the Armenians could take to avoid being 
killed: "that all of them should turn Moslem, that four virgins should be surrendered to 
the men of Omerli, [or] that payment should be made to the family of the murdered Kurd 
of 25,000 piasters."2 1 6 Using a number of German sources to gather information about 
the conflict of 1894-1896, Johannes Lepsius compiled some statistics that show the 
Kurds' bid for power by means of Islamization: 2,493 villages were forcibly converted to 
Islam, 456 churches and monasteries were desecrated, and 649 churches were converted 
2 1 5
 Lynch, 430-431. 
$imsir, British Documents, 4: 255. 
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into mosques. 2 1 7 
2 1 7
 Johannes Lepsius and J Rendell Harris, Armenia and Europe; an Indictment (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 330-331. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study of Kurdish-Armenian relations has attempted to reveal the network of 
both agency-based and structure-influenced interactions that led to instances of both 
collaboration and conflict between Kurdish and Armenian groups in the late nineteenth 
century. Three main conclusions can be reached through this analysis. First, trends in 
conflict and collaboration and collaboration between the Armenians and the Kurds are 
largely a product of the asymmetry in the Kurdish and Armenian social and power 
structures. While the social and power structures of Armenian society gave rise to 
widespread political consciousness among Armenians, those in Kurdish society did not 
generally awaken the Kurds to a consciousness of political identity. 
The division of the Armenian millet during the 1840s and 1850s into the 
Protestant, Catholic, and Gregorian millets, and the Armenian constitution of 1861, 
severely weakened the power of the Armenian Patriarch and opened up space for the 
emergence of new representative elements of Armenian society. It was the efforts of the 
newly emerging Armenian bourgeois class during the 1860s and 1870s, which infiltrated 
the traditional Armenian power structure, to draw the attention of the Ottomans and the 
Europeans to the plight of Armenian peasants in eastern Anatolia that gave rise to the 
Armenian Question and instilled Armenians throughout the Empire with an increased 
sense of ethnic and national consciousness. The failure of Armenian political activists to 
achieve an autonomous Armenia at the Congress of Berlin, in addition to the subsequent 
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failure of the Ottomans to implement the necessary reforms for the Armenians, led many 
Armenians to take more radical measures to gain independence. While the Ottomans 
were able to dissolve the power of Armenian nationalist groups within their domain, 
these groups gained unchecked popularity outside of the Empire. 
By contrast to Armenian society, there was no urban-based bourgeois class that 
emerged in Kurdish society during the late nineteenth century. During the 1860s and 
1870s the religious class was the only body left in Kurdish society that had sufficient 
clout to unite the Kurds behind a single political cause. However, the religious class 
proved to act much like the beys in that they switched back and forth between loyalties in 
order to suit their own political interests. While Shaykh 'Ubaydullah made claims of a 
'Kurdish question' and even called for the creation of a Kurdish state, his political actions 
were not grounded in any sort of nationalist ideology. Rather he appeared mainly 
motivated out of concern that the Ottomans would undertake the reforms for the 
Armenians that would lead to the creation of an independent Armenia and the subsequent 
loss of his power. He was compliant with the Ottomans to the extent that they granted 
him certain ruling privileges. 
Second, the factors that influenced the interactive behavior of the Kurds and the 
Armenians extended well beyond individual localities. Trends in conflict and 
collaboration between Armenians and Kurds are interconnected with not only local 
eastern Anatolian politics, but also regional and global politics. The power struggle 
between Russia and Britain over hegemonic control of the Ottoman Empire made eastern 
Anatolia, a region that was once a hinterland insignificant to outside interests, into a zone 
of strategic interest. The political strategies of Britain and Russia to co-opt resistance 
111 
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movements throughout the Ottoman Empire prompted the Ottomans to reform their 
governing system and reinforce their presence in areas over which they had previously 
had tenuous control. Ottomans' continual attempts to centralize control over eastern 
Anatolia, both during the tanzimat period and the Sultan Abdulhamid II period, had a 
tremendous impact on the traditional power structures in Kurdish and Armenian society 
which had kept eastern Anatolian society relatively intact during earlier periods. The 
dissolution of the power of the Kurdish beys led to the fragmentation of Kurdish society 
and fostered greater competition between Kurdish tribes for power. In the midst of the 
power struggle between the Kurdish tribes both Kurdish and Armenian peasants suffered 
the most. 
Third, while the structures limited the available choices from which actors could 
choose, conflict and collaboration between the Kurds and Armenians was the result of a 
complex network of agency-driven decisions that actors made at both high and low 
levels. Actors' decisions had a direct impact on the arrangement of the power structures 
in society. For instance, it was the policies and decisions of Sultan Abdulhamid II that 
either prompted change in power-sharing arrangements or perpetuated already existing 
arrangements. His decision to form the Hamidiye Cavalry produced a power-sharing 
environment that perpetuated existing structures in Kurdish society. The Hamidiye 
cavalry essentially restored the power of many influential tribal chiefs whose power had 
begun to wane as a result of the tanzimat. 
While some of the Armenian revolutionaries were against the idea of non-
Armenian participation in the nationalist cause, others parties favored a Kurdish-
Armenian alliance against the Ottomans. Likewise, many of the Kurdish chiefs saw 
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friendly relations with the Armenians as generally advantageous to their political cause. 
Therefore, the conflict between Kurds and Armenians in the 1890s cannot be seen as a 
product of the lack of options for collaboration. Instead, conflict arose as a product of the 
growing influence of the Hunchaks in eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans' cooption of 
leading Kurdish chiefs to guard against the revolutionaries, and the failure of the Sultan 
Abdulhamid II to provide sufficient security to halt internecine skirmishes. The 
Hunchaks' espousal of instigative tactics as a means of gaining an autonomous Armenian 
state had a marked effect on the state of relations between Kurds and Armenians. It was 
as a result of their activism in the early 1890s that there came an upsurge in violence in 
eastern Anatolia, which had been increasingly orderly and calm in the late 1880s 
according to some reports. While the Ottomans had been attempting to gain the 
allegiance of the Kurdish tribes during the 1880s, the Hunchak movement was one of the 
main reasons that Sultan Abdulhamid II took further steps to integrate the Kurds into the 
state through the formation of the Hamidiye Cavalry. Although the Hamidiye Cavalry 
was established with the intent of providing security, it tended to fan the conflict rather 
than quell it. Hamidiye chiefs in essence received a carte blanche from the Ottomans to 
acquire power over rival Kurdish tribes and Armenians by whatever means possible. 
While one can only speculate whether or not Kurds and Armenians would have 
assimilated and collaborated to a greater extent were it not for the Ottoman Empire's 
policies which distinguished between Muslim and non-Muslim, it is clear that such 
distinctions of identity were perpetuated through institutions, whether the political 
institutions of the Ottoman Empire, or the political and social institutions of the Kurds 
and the Armenians. Collective interactive behavioral trends between two groups can be 
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largely explained as a result of the power structures and the agency of those in power 
rather than as a consequence of their primordial (ethnic, religious, and cultural) identities. 
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